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Over the last three decades, the world's industrialized
democracies have introduced competition into previously
noncompetitive, regulated markets. While this deregulatory' trend is
by no means absolute or uniform, what were once tightly regulated
airline, banking, minerals, telephone, gas, and electric markets are
now far more open and less regulated than ever before. 2 Where
governments once favored state ownership or intrusive public utility
regulation, they now seem willing to restructure regulated markets to
try some form of competition. In the energy industry, these first
experiments with competition have not gone smoothly. Emerging
t Visiting Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, and Professor of Law, Politics &
Regulation, University of Texas at Austin.
1 This trend is popularly known as "deregulation." See, e.g., Jim Yardley, Texas Learns
in California How Not to Deregulate, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2001, at A12. However, many
scholars prefer the term "restructuring," since a great deal of regulation remains. See, e.g.,
David B. Spence, The Politics of Electricity Restructuring: Theory vs. Practice,40 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 417 (2005).
2

For a general discussion of this trend, see COMPETITION IN REGULATED INDUSTRIES

(Dieter Helm & Tim Jenkinson eds., 1998).
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energy markets have shown wholesale price volatility3 and higherthan-expected prices4 in both the United States and Europe. The
inability of prospective entrants to secure access to energy5 (for resale
to prospective customers), to the network 6 (for delivering energy to
customers), or to both has further hampered the move toward a
single European market in energy. These disappointing experiences
with restructured energy markets have slowed the march toward
markets in some places and spawned frustration among the
proponents of restructuring. The movement toward markets
7
continues but much more haltingly and cautiously than before.
Can restructuring work? More specifically, can law manage
competitive energy markets so that they realize the promise of lower
prices? In order to answer that question, we must first address others.
First, what is the objective of restructuring? How do we measure
success? Are we seeking a Pareto improvement8 over the status quo,
or is a Kaldor-Hicks improvement 9 sufficient? If we seek Kaldor-Hicks
improvements, can law protect the vulnerable in these new markets
without destroying the markets themselves? In this Article, I argue
that policymakers and commentators have underappreciated the role
politics plays in answering these questions, sometimes ignoring the
tension between the political imperatives and economic imperatives
that guide the restructuring process.
After explaining in Part I of the Article how and why energy
markets have been restructured, Part II examines briefly our initial
experiences with restructuring in both the United States and Europe.
That examination acknowledges that restructuring has not (yet)
achieved the benefits for which some of its proponents hoped. Part
III ascribes at least some of the responsibility for these defeated
expectations to conflicts between the political and economic
imperatives driving the restructuring process. Part IV concludes with
a plea for a policy that does not paper over these conflicts and does
not shield ratepayers (read, voters) from an essential truth about
See infra Part II.A.
See infra notes 68-76 and accompanying text.
5 See infra Part II.C.1.
6
See infra Part II.C.2.
7 See infra notes 143-47 and accompanying text.
8
Economists use the term "Pareto efficient" to refer to a distribution of resources for
which no different distribution can make someone better off without making someone else
worse off. See HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICs: A MODERN APPROACH 15
(7th ed. 2006). Thus, a Pareto improvement is a change that makes at least one person
better off without making anyone worse off. See id.
9 Economists use the term "Kaldor-Hicks efficient" to refer to a distribution that
3

4

maximizes social net benefits. See POcHARD A.

POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF

LAw 13-14

(7th ed. 2007). Thus, a Kaldor-Hicks improvement is a change that increases social net
benefits but does not necessarily make everyone better off. See id. at 14.
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energy markets: namely, if we choose to seek the net benefits of
market efficiency, we must also accept that net benefits are not merely
benefits. That is, they represent benefits to some (or during some
periods of time) and costs to others (or at other times). Part IV
suggests that by confronting voters with this tradeoff, they ought to
choose, through their elected representatives, either to accept the
costs that come with market benefits or to pay more for less price risk.
I
FROM REGULATION TO MARKETS

The recent restructuring of energy markets represents a sharp departure from traditional thinking and historical practice. Shortly after
the creation of the electric and gas industries more than a century
ago, policymakers in Europe and the United States concluded that
both industries were natural monopolies for which competition was
inappropriate due to their large economies of scale, or decreasing
marginal and average costs across a very large range of output. 10
Hence, a monopoly supplier would be more efficient from a cost
standpoint. However, a monopoly supplier left to its own devices
would produce goods of a lower quantity at a higher price, thereby
capturing for itself some of what would, in a competitive market, be
consumer surplus." Because energy was too important a commodity
to be left to the whims of the market, 12 governments the world over
determined that they would be deeply involved in electric and gas
sales and services as providers, regulators, or both.
Consequently, in much of the world, electric and gas services
were provided by state-owned firms, at least until very recently. 13 In
Europe, for example, state-owned firms were the norm prior to the

10

See James McManus, Natural Gas, in 2 ENERGY LAW AND TRANSACTIONS

ch. 50,

§ 50.04 [1] [a] [i]-[ii] (DavidJ. Muchow & William A. Mogel eds., 2003);Jeffrey W. Meyers
& Robert M. Lamkin, Electricity, in 2 ENERGY LAw AND TRANSACTIONS, supra, ch. 52, § 52.02.

11 See, e.g., VARIAN, supra note 8, at 429-30. This captured consumer surplus is termed
"producer surplus." See id. at 431-32. Monopoly pricing will also reduce the total value of
the producer surplus and the consumer surplus in a market. See id. at 432-33. This lost
value is called the "deadweight loss." Id.
12 See McManus, supra note 10, § 50.04 (1] [a] [i]-[ii]; Meyers & Lamkin, supra note
10, § 52.03.
13
See, e.g., Gerald D. Prager, Peinex at the Crossroads:A National Oil Industry in Crisis, 15
Hous. J. INT'L L. 115, 139 (1992) (explaining that, as of 1992, Guatemala was Latin
America's only oil-producing nation without a state-owned oil company).
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late 1980s,14 and they remain common in the developing world. 1 5 In

the United States, by contrast, private provision of these services was
the dominant model, 16 though not the only one.' 7 Under this model,
governments licensed private firms as monopoly suppliers, closely regulating their rates and conditions of service. 1 8 Each of these approaches to the provision of energy services had its own way of
controlling the tendency of monopoly sellers toward monopoly pricing. In democracies using the state-owned enterprise model, political
pressure-namely, voters' desire for cheap, reliable energy-would
act as a check on monopoly pricing.' 9 Countries using the private
sector model used regulation to control price. In the United States,
for example, the Federal Power Act of 1935 and its state analogs created regulatory agencies to review the electric and gas rates charged
14 See Arek Krasnodebski & Tomasz Janas, Energy Transactionsin the European Economic
Community, in 6 ENERGY LAW AND TRANSACTIONS, supra note 10, ch. 163, 163-1 to -2. Examples include the predecessors to firms like France's Electricite de France (EDF), Italy's
Enel and Eni, Germany's E.On, Spain's Endesa, and Britain's National Power (NP) and
PowerGen (PG).
15 For example, Mexico's Comisi6n Federal de Electricidad, seeJohn P. Mathis et al.,
Electric Power and Natural Gas Legislation in Mexico and the New Regulatoy Framework, in 6
ENERGY LAW AND TRANSACTIONS, supra note 10, ch. 165, §§ 165.01-.02, and Brazil's Eletrobras, see James v. Derrick, Jr. & Robert H. Walls, JR., Natural Gas and Electric Markets in
South America, in 6 ENERGY LAW AND TRANSACTIONS, supra note 10, ch. 164, § 164.03[3]
(noting, however, that privatization has begun), and most of Latin America relies on stateowned firms to provide gas and electric service. See id. § 164.01[1].
16 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, public demand for electric
power grew, and electric systems arose in major American metropolitan areas. Some were
publicly owned, others privately owned. Some used central station technology, delivering
power over a grid; others employed smaller, geographically distributed generators. See
Meyers & Lamkin, supra note 10, § 52.01. The fight over public versus private ownership is
chronicled in ROBERT A. CARO, THE POWER BROKER: ROBERT MOSES AND THE FALL OF NEW

YORK (1975). See also Patrick McGuire & Mark Granovetter, Business and Bias in Public
Policy Formation: The National Civic Federation and Social Construction of Electric Utility
Regulation, 1905-1907 (Aug. 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). That
fight eventually produced the system we have today, dominated by state-chartered, vertically integrated, investor-owned utilities providing monopoly electric service within their
designated service areas, using their own central-station technology and distribution grid.
See PAUL L. JosKow & RICHlARD SCHMALENSEE, MARKETS FOR POWER: AN ANALYSIS OF ELECTRIC UTILITY DEREGULATION 11-13 (1983).
17 Fifteen percent of American consumers of electric power receive their service from
publicly owned entities, such as municipal power agencies like the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power or federal power agencies like the Tennessee Valley Authority.
Another nine percent belong to rural electric cooperatives. Investor-owned utilities serve
the remainder. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY OVERVIEW, availa-

ble at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/prim2/toc2.html (last visited Mar. 8,
2008).
18 See JosKow & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 16, at 13 (describing the franchising
process).
19 In nondemocratic societies, a Machiavellian equivalent may have been at work.
Rulers whose legitimacy does not come from elections might depend on the provision of a
sound economy to ensure social stability and their own legitimacy. Certainly, the provision
of cheap and reliable energy services is an integral part of that mission.
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by private monopoly service providers.2 0 Traditional regulation guaranteed that licensed monopoly energy service providers would be able
to charge administratively established rates that allowed the companies a "fair" return on their prudently made investments. 21 In return,
these "public utilities" agreed to meet a variety of service obligations
to the general public, including the obligation to serve all eligible customers and provide a reliable source of supply. 22 State public service
commissions regulated retail rates, and the Federal Energy Regulatory
23
Commission (FERC) regulated wholesale rates.
Whether state-owned or privately owned and publicly regulated,
energy service providers in many places were vertically integrated
companies, producing most of their own energy (and buying some on
wholesale markets), transmitting 24 it over their own distribution systems, and selling it directly to their retail customers. 25 Figure 1 represents such a situation. In Figure 1, EnergyCo owns: (i) the energy
See Meyers & Lamkin, supra note 10, § 52.02.
21 The standard way of describing the ratemaking process is to say that in rate cases,
utility commissions typically make rate decisions using the following equation: R = Br + 0,
where R represents the company's total revenue requirements, B represents the rate base, r
represents the permissible rate of return on investment, and 0 represents permissible op20

erating expenses. See SIDNEY A. SHAPIRo &JoSEPH P. TOMAIN, REGULATORY LAW AND POLICY.
CASES AND MATERIALS 109 (3d ed. 2003). Assets that are used for and useful to the com-

pany's task of supplying electric service are includable within the rate base, and the company is guaranteed a fair rate of return on these assets. See id. at 110. Most states treat any
prudently made investment in such assets as properly includable in the rate base. See id. at
111.
22 These obligations include the duty to provide reliable service to all qualified customers, rules against discrimination in the provision of the service, and more. See, e.g.,
66
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1501-1502 (West 2000 & Supp. 2007).

23 The jurisdictional line between the FERC and state commissions does not perfectly
track the line between wholesale and retail transactions, but prior to unbundling, the
FERC did not exercise jurisdiction over prices of retail energy transactions. See New York v.
FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 5-7 (2002).
24 Traditionally, American regulators have used the term "transmission" to describe
the movement of electricity over the high voltage network, and "distribution" to describe
the movement of electricity over lower voltage lines closer to the end users. See Meyers &
Lamkin, supra note 10, § 52.01. Similarly, regulators use the term "transportation" to describe the movement of gas through high-pressure pipes, and "distribution" to describe
movement through smaller pipes closer to end users. See Jonathan D. Schneider et al.,
Natural Gas Transportation, in 4 ENERGY LAw AND TRANSACTIONS: CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT

ch. 83, § 83.01 (DavidJ. Muchow & William A. Mogel eds., 2004). Consistent with recent
practice at both the FERC and the European Commission, when discussing general issues
associated with the movement of energy through a delivery network, I will use the term
"transmission."
25
See New York v. FERC, 533 U.S. at 5. There were many specific exceptions to this
general truth in different places. For example, in the United States, gas producers were
unaffiliated with gas pipelines, at least until recently. See McManus, supra note 10,
§ 50.0311] [a]. In Germany, retailers of electricity were not affiliated with the generators
and transmission owners. See Thomas von Danwitz, Regulation and Liberalizationof the European Electricity Market-A German View, 27 ENERGY L.J. 423, 427-28 (2006) (describing the
three-tiered German system). Nevertheless, it is fair to say that prior to restructuring, a
large degree of vertical integration was commonplace in many parts of the world.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:765

production units (electric generators or gas production wells) that
contribute energy to the network; (ii) the transmission and delivery
network; and (iii) the energy that runs through the network, which in
turn is sold to its customers. Under this traditional vertically integrated structure, arms-length wholesale energy transactions were
rare. 26 When the monopoly service provider lacked the energy to
meet demand, it could purchase energy from neighboring providers;
when those neighboring providers needed energy, the monopoly service provider could return the favor. 27 As the owner of the network, it
provided the necessary balancing services-it balanced supply and demand over time to ensure that the amount of energy in the network
was sufficient to meet ever-changing customer demands. 28 Customers
paid a rate for energy service that reflected all of these functionsproduction, distribution, and sale of energy-bundled together into
one service.
The impulse to restructure the electric and gas industries had
both an economic and a political basis. Its economic rationale was
part of a sea change in economic thinking in the 1970s and 1980s,
which saw increased faith in the ability of markets to achieve efficient
outcomes through competition and reduced faith in the ability of governments to achieve efficient outcomes through regulation or production of service. 29 State-owned and regulated firms had very little
incentive to keep the cost of service low. Indeed, most state-owned
firms were not self-financed, and often there were no profits to maximize. 30 Correspondingly, American public utilities had an incentive
26 See Meyers & Lamkin, supra note 10, § 52.01 [6] [ [b] [ii] (discussing the more common practice of cooperation through pooling).
27 See Richard D. Cudahy, Whither Deregulation: A Look at the Portents, 58 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 155, 172 (2001).
28 Gas networks have very little associated storage capacity, see William F. Bailey et al.,
State Regulation of Oil and Gas Production,in 1 ENERGY LAW AND TRANSACTIONS: CUMULATIVE
SUPPLEMENT, supra note 24, ch. 5, § 5.01 [2], and electric networks have essentially none, see
Reinier H.J.H. Lock & Marlene L. Stein, Electricity Transmission, in 4 ENERGY LAW AND
TRANSACTIONS: CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT, supra note 24, ch. 81, § 81.02[1]. That means
that at any given moment, the amount of energy being added to the system by producers
necessarily equals the amount of energy being removed by users. Constant pressure moves
gas throughout the network; without sufficient pressure, customers cannot take gas from
the system. See INST. OF GAS TECH., NATURAL GAS IN NONTECHNICAL LANGUAGE 43 (Rebecca
L. Busby ed., 1999) (describing the system of high-pressure natural gas pipelines). Similarly, electrons move through the electric grid following the path of least resistance. See id.
These essential facts create the need for balancing services and management of the network to ensure reliability of service. See id. The network managers must ensure that as
demand fluctuates, additional energy is ready to come on- and off-line at very short notice
and that pathways are not too congested, among other things. See id.
29

See SIDNEY A.

SHAPIRO &JOSEPH

P. TOMAIN,

REGULATORY LAW AND POLICY- CASES AND

MATERIA.Ls 20-21 (3d ed. 2003) (describing a move away from regulation in general and
noting the effect on natural gas and electricity industries).
30
State-owned firms sometimes provided service for free or for a nominal charge.
This was true not only in former Soviet block countries but in some democracies as well.
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to maximize capital investment instead because under the traditional
"cost plus fair return" approach to setting rates, a larger "rate base"
31

meant more revenues.
Furthermore, rate regulation of investor-owned utilities entails
considerable transaction costs. 32 Regulators must depend on the regulated firms to divulge their cost information. While Commission
staff and ratepayer advocate groups intervene in rate cases and review
this information with a fine-tooth comb, they cannot hope to overcome the information asymmetries inherent in the process.3 3 To its
critics, a system with high transaction costs, information asymmetries,
and perverse incentives will yield unnecessarily high electric rates in
34
both wholesale and retail markets.
India, for example, subsidized residential prices and provided free electricity to farms. HuBERT H. REINEBERG, India's Electricity Sector in Transition: Can Its Giant Goals Be Met?, 19
ELECTR1Ci-yJ. 77 (2006) (describing artificially low electricity rates historically in India).
Mexican history is similar. See Rafael Friedmann & Claudia Sheinbaum, Mexican Electric
End-Use Efficiency: Experiences to Date, 23 ANN. REV. ENERGY ENV'T 225 (1998) (describing
Mexican subsidies historically). Even if state-owned firms charged for service, they were
not necessarily operated as profit-maximizing businesses, and their revenues may have
gone into the national treasury and been used for purposes other than those of the firm.
31
See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text (discussing how public utilities could
charge rates to receive compensation for good investments).
32
See Antonio Estache & David Martimort, Politics, TransactionCosts, and the Design of
Regulatory Institutions 1 n.2 (World Bank Pol. Research, Working Paper No. 2073, 1999),
availableat http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractjid620512 (describing transaction costs in regulation as an asymmetric information problem).
33
See id.
34
For a good discussion of these efficiency issues, see Stephen Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure:Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform, 92 HARV. L. REv. 547, 551,
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This criticism formed the philosophical basis of the deregulatory
agenda of the Reagan and Thatcher governments in the 1980s,3 5 and
economists began to challenge the premise that the provision of energy service is a natural monopoly at all. Energy service might be a
natural monopoly if the production and delivery of energy were necessarily one bundled product; but they are not. Rather, the production and delivery of energy are two separate products. Deliverytransmission and distribution service-is a natural monopoly because
the construction of duplicate delivery networks between two points is
often inefficient. The production (and sale) of energy, however, is
not a natural monopoly. We can unbundle production (and sales)
from distribution so that buyers in wholesale and retail markets can
choose their energy supplier even if they must take delivery service
from a monopoly provider. Competition in energy production should
eventually weed out those producers that cannot provide reliable service at competitive prices. Accordingly, consumers-broadly defined
to include all consumer classes-should benefit from the cost discipline that competition brings.3 6 In this way, competitive markets
should represent a Kaldor-Hicks improvement over regulated markets. Thus, proponents of restructuring argued that distribution service should remain regulated while energy production should be
open to competition.
Once this theoretical foundation was fully developed, restructuring of the electric and gas industries ensued remarkably quickly. In
the 1980s, the Thatcher government in the United Kingdom privatized state-owned gas and electric firms, eventually breaking up the
former state-owned monopoly and mandating unbundling of production from distribution.3 7 At the same time, in the United States, a
series of FERC initiatives in the 1980s and early 1990s mandated the
unbundling of production and wholesale sales from distribution in
609 (1979) (providing a basic framework for analyzing regulation and concluding that the
energy market is a good candidate for "less restrictive alternatives" to regulation).
35 See Ronald Chen &Jon Hanson, The Ilusion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas of Moder Policy and Corporate Law, 103 MIcH. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (2004) (noting that Margaret
Thatcher thought that "[g]overnment was doing too much" and that Ronald Reagan
shared her ideological views); see also Daniel Yergin, The Revolution of 1979, WALL ST.J., May
3, 1999, at A22 (describing the joint message of Margaret Thatcher and Deng Xiaoping as
an economic revolution embracing markets over communism).
36
See, e.g.,
Memorandum from the Elec. Power Supply Ass'n on the Benefits of Competition 4-5, available at http://www.epsa.org/forms/uploadFiles/34790000001 .filename.
CompetitiveBenefitsMemo_-_121003.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2008) (citing several examples of price reductions after increased competition in power suppliers).
37
See William W. Hogan, Professor of Public Policy and Administration, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Making Markets in Power, Lecture at the
Royal Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures & Commerce 4-5 (Feb. 21,
2000), available at http://ksghome.harvard.edu/-whogan/rsa0200.pdf.
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the gas industry, 38 transforming pipelines that were once middlemen
selling bundled energy services into "common carriers" providing delivery services to all users on a nondiscriminatory basis. 39 Shortly
thereafter, the FERC and Congress 40 brought full unbundling of
wholesale electricity markets, 4 1 prompting more vertically integrated
38
Gas shortages in the 1970s and market distortions borne (in part) of poor regulation prompted the FERC to restructure gas markets first. See generally RichardJ. Pierce, Jr.,
Reconstitutingthe Natural Gas Industry from Wellhead to Burnertip,9 ENERcY L.J. 1 (1988) (summarizing the disastrous experiment with regulating producer sales and the road to deregulation of such sales). In 1985, the FERC issued Order 436, compelling any pipeline
providing voluntary third-party transmission services to do so on a nondiscriminatory,
open-access basis. See Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, Order No. 436, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,408 (Oct. 18, 1985) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 2,
157, 250, 284, 375, and 381). Seven years later, the FERC ordered full unbundling of
transmission and energy sales by all pipelines in Order 636, freeing pipeline customersmostly local distribution utilities, electric generators, and large industrial users-to
purchase their gas from the least-cost seller, using the pipeline only for transmission services. See Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol; Order
Denyin Rehearing and Clarifying Order Nos. 636 and 636-A, Order No. 636-B, 57 Fed. Reg.
57,911 (Dec. 8, 1992) [hereinafter FERC Order No. 636-B] (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt.
284).
39
See generally Pierce, supra note 38 (discussing the distinction between "common carriers" and "public utilities" in regulatory law). It was not until Order 636 that pipelines
were saddled with the obligation to provide nondiscriminatory transmission service to the
public. See FERC Order No. 636-B, supra note 38.
40
The pressure to unbundle transmission from sales in the electricity industry had
been building in the United States since passage of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies
Act of 1978 (PURPA), one of the statutory responses to the energy crises of the 1970s.
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, § 2, 92 Stat. 3117, 3119
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 15, 16, and 30 U.S.C.). PURPA seeks to
promote the development of renewable and efficient generation technologies by offering
nonutility entrepreneurs financial incentives to build generation plants using such technologies. See id. The statute required electric utilities to purchase power from these plants,
called "qualifying facilities" or "QFs," at favorable rates. See id. By the 1990s, Congress and
the FERC were growing more comfortable with the notion that production and wholesale
sales of electricity could be a competitive business. For example, in 1992, Congress expanded the class of nonutility generators to include "exempt wholesale generators"
(EWGs); EWGs did not need to meet the size and fuel specifications of QFs but could sell
power wholesale without having to comply with the extensive requirements applicable to
investor-owned utilities under the Federal Power Act. See Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub.
L. No. 102-486, § 711, 106 Stat. 2776, 2905-10 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C.).
41
While the Energy Policy Act of 1992 and prior FERC actions had already mandated
that utilities supply third parties with transmission services under certain circumstances
(called "wheeling"), wholesale electricity restructuring began in earnest with FERC's Orders 888 and 889, issued in 1996. See Energy Policy Act of 1992; § 721, 106 Stat. at 2915;
Open Access Same-Time Information System (Formerly Real-Time Information Networks)
and Standards of Conduct, Order No. 889, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,737 (May 10, 1996) [hereinafter FERC Order No. 889] (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 37); Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public
Utilities, Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (May 10, 1996) [hereinafter FERC Order No.
888] (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 37); FERC Order No. 636-B, supra note 38. Order 888
required transmission line owners to file so-called "open-access tariffs" offering nondiscriminatory transmission services and to "functionally unbundle[ ]" transmission from
electricity sales. See FERC Order No. 888, supra. Order 889 mandated transparency in
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electric utilities to sell or spin off generation assets and to separate
their transmission and distribution functions from their production,
42
To facilitate this sepaeither legally or functionally within the firm.

ration, the FERC encouraged the formation of independent transmission-system operators to manage transmission systems; 43 and by the
end of the twentieth century, robust gas44and electric wholesale markets were common in the United States.
The restructuring of American retail energy markets has been
more gradual and less uniform. A sizeable minority of American
states have followed the national lead, taking a variety of different approaches to unbundle production and retail electric sales from local
45
distribution, thus introducing competition into retail sales markets.

Only a few American states have tried to unbundle energy sales from
distribution in gas services. 46 The California energy crisis of
2000-2001 cowed some states into halting their restructuring plans,
though retail competition continued in sixteen states and the District
transmission services by requiring all takers of transmission services (including affiliates of
the transmission owner) to take such services using an open-access posting system. See
FERC Order No. 889, supra.
See FERC Order No. 888, supra note 41. Full legal separation was not required
42
though some firms chose that route. See id. at 21,552.
43 See id. This action was prompted by the concern that fragmented ownership of the
transmission grid would hinder the development and smooth operation of electricity markets, as each of many owners demanded a separate rate from customers for the transmission of electricity along each segment of the grid (so-called "pancaking" of rates). Order
888 encouraged transmission owners to transfer operational control over their transmission lines to independent system operators (ISOs) who would manage the grid independently from the interests of any particular transmission system stakeholder. See id. Order
888 prompted the formation of ISOs in New York, the Middle Atlantic region (so-called
"PJM," or Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland ISO), New England, and a few other places.
See id. at 21,593-94. In an attempt to further encourage and broaden the geographic
scope of this trend, the FERC issued Order 2000, encouraging the formation of so-called
Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs). See Regional Transmission Organizations,
Order No. 2000, 65 Fed. Reg. 810 (Jan. 6, 2000) [hereinafter FERC Order No. 2000] (to be
codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). See generally FERC, RTO/ISO, http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto.asp (last visited Feb. 1, 2008) (describing the existing RTOs
and providing a map with links to regional-specific information).
44

See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. NATURAL GAS MARKETS: RECENT TRENDS AND PROS-

PECTS FOR THE FUTURE 1, 16, 20 (2001); Stephen P. Sherwin, DeregulationofElectricity in New
York: A Continuing Odyssey 1996-2001, 12 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 263, 273, 278-80 (2001).
45
See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 44, at 20; Sherwin, supra note 44, at 273,

278-80; Mark Hand, Retail Choice Rides Again: A Mixed Market in the Lone Star State, PUB.
UTIL. FORT., July 15, 2002 (Magazine), at 16; David Sibley & Steven Wolens, Plansfor Texas'
DeregulationAre Looking Bright, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEws, Dec. 29, 2000, at 5C; Yardley,
supra note 1.
For a summary of state efforts to restructure retail gas markets, see ENERGY INFO.
46
ADMIN., NATURAL GAS RESIDENTIAL CHOICE PROGRAMS (2007), available at http://www.eia.
doe.gov/oil-gas/naturalgas/restructure/restructure.html (classifying the restructuring
efforts of states according to active unbundling, inactive or limited unbundling, unbundling in the implementation phase, partial unbundling, no unbundling, and discontinued unbundling programs).
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of Columbia. 4 7 Regardless of the uneven nature of American retail
restructuring, wholesale trading markets in both gas and electricity
48
continued to thrive in many parts of the United States.
While the United States was restructuring its markets, the privatization of European state-owned energy firms 49 and the European
Union's commitment to a "single market" in goods and services 5 °1 fed
the restructuring impulse in Europe. The European Commission's
first initiatives toward the creation of competitive European energy
markets came in the late 1990s in a series of directives 5 1 to national
governments, which laid the groundwork 5 2 for the unbundling of pro53
duction, sales, and distribution. The Commission's 2003 directives
finally mandated functional unbundling 5 4 of integrated firms and es47

See VA. STATE CORP. COMM'N, 2005 PERFORMANCE REVIEW OF ELECTRIC POWER MAR-

KETS: UPDATE AND PERSPECTIVE 34 (2005),

http://www.scc.virginia.gov/caseinfo/reports/

2005_rose.pdf (reporting that sixteen states and the District of Columbia allow retail access
to electricity markets). See infra notes 238-242 and accompanying text for a description of
postrestructuring developments in American states.
48
Gas markets are well developed and mature, with trading organized around "hubs."
Organized electricity markets tend to exist where states have restructured markets around
an ISO or RTO. For a good summary of the major American gas and electric trading hubs,
see FERC OFFICE OF MKT. OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, 2004 STATE OF THE MARKETS
REPORT 7-8 (2005), available at http://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/st-mkt-ovr/som-rpt2004.pdf.
49
See Stilpon Nestor & Ladan Mahboobi, Privatisation Trends, FIN. MARKET TRENDS
No. 72, Feb. 1999, at 131-32, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/27/
1897869.pdf; see alsojosKow & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 16 (providing background on the
electric-power industry and its deregulation).
50
See Single European Act, art. 13, 1986 O.J. (L 169) 7 (EC). Member states of the
European Union (EU) signed the Single European Act in 1986, committing the EU to the
formation of a single market in goods and services by 1992. The Act modified the foundational laws of the EU, which were embodied in a series of treaties beginning with the 1957
Treaty of Rome. See Single European Act, 1986 OJ. (L 169) (providing a concise summary
of the EU's foundational laws and of the Single European Act).
51 At the European level, the European Commission's Directorate of Energy and
Transport has been the primary actor pushing restructuring, primarily through "directives"
which do not have the force of law. Rather, they direct national governments to enact
domestic legislation implementing the directive. The consequences for failure to implement the directive are specified by the treaties that form the basic law of the European
Union. In most cases, the European Commission initiates proceedings against the
noncompliant member state that could eventually culminate in litigation before the European Court of Justice. See Charles W. Smitherman III, Growing Pains: European Union Enlargement and the Restructuringof the European Commission Under the Treaty of Nice, 15 FLA.J.
INT'L L. 243, 249-54 (2002) (describing this enforcement process); see also European
Comm'n, Report from the Commission to the Council: Explaining Europe's Enlargement, COM
(2002) 281 final (June 5, 2002) (analyzing the challenges and benefits of the enlargement
of the European Union).
Council Directive 98/30, art. 13, 1998 OJ. (L 204) 6-7 (EC) (laying the ground52
work for later restructuring by mandating that integrated firms keep separate accounts for
transmission and energy sales).
53
Council Directive 2003/55, 2003 O.J. (L 176) 57 (EC).
54
Council Directive 2003/54, arts. 10, 15, 2003 O.J. (L 176) 37, 45, 46 (EC) (specifically declining to mandate full legal or "ownership" unbundling).
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tablished a timetable for introducting competition and consumer
choice throughout European gas and electricity markets. 55 Like their
American counterparts, the 2003 directives encouraged member
states to form independent transmission system operators 5 6 to manage
networks independently of any particular system stakeholder. Despite
the lack of physical integration of the energy transmission network
across many national borders and the absence of a single European
energy regulator to enforce restructuring mandates directly, increasingly active wholesale markets are now functioning in the United
Kingdom, 5 7 Scandinavia, 58 France, 59 Belgium, 60 and various parts of
central Europe.

61

II
THE PERFORMANCE OF ENERGY MARKETS So FAR

So, how have energy markets performed so far? While results are
mixed, both American and European regulators have struggled with
the problem of cultivating energy markets that will promote healthy
competition in energy sales, reduce prices for all customers, and control the exercise of market power by incumbents.
A.

Prices

While there is some disagreement about the particular effects of
restructuring on prices, restructuring has not brought the kind of general decline in energy prices across customer classes that many expected. Separating cost-based price effects from the effects of
differing regulatory regimes is extremely difficult, and academic studies of the effects of restructuring reach conflicting conclusions.
Among studies of American markets, studies of the so-called PJM electricity market, 6 2 reputed to be one of the most efficient in the United
States, tend to find measurable efficiency gains in the form of lower55

Id. art. 10, at 52-53.

The European Commission uses this term, which is frequently abbreviated "TSO,"
to refer to independent operators of delivery networks. In the American system, they are
called either ISOs or RTOs. These organizations provide a variety of network management
functions and their management decisions are made without regard to the wishes of the
delivery system owners.
57
ELEXON, http://www.elexon.co.uk (last visited Feb. 2, 2008).
58
Nord Pool, http://www.nordpool.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2008).
59
Powernext, http://www.powemext.fr (last visited Feb. 2, 2008).
60
Belpex, http://www.belpex.be (last visited Feb. 2, 2008).
61
See European Comm'n, Directorate Gen. for Competition, Report on Energy Sector
Inquiry, at 331-35, SEC (2006) 1724 (Jan. 10, 2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
comm/competition/sectors/energy/inquiry/full-report-part4.pdf (providing a detailed,
current discussion of existing European energy markets).
62
"PJM" stands for "Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland" and refers to the market administered by the PJM independent system operator and regional transmission organization, the borders of which extend well beyond those three states. For a map of the PJM's
56
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than-expected prices. 63 Some other studies are less sanguine about
markets, ascribing to restructuring not only cost increases but also a
host of other ills. American wholesale gas markets appear to be functioning fairly well, 6 4 unlike their European counterparts; 65 however,
in neither place is retail competition in gas sales widespread. 66 Studies of the effects of restructuring on European energy prices reach
similarly conflicting conclusions, some praising the apparently wellfunctioning U.K. markets, but most concluding generally that prices
have increased in most European markets since the 2003 directives.
While the European Commission believes that gas price increases are
attributable to factors other than restructuring, 6 7 prices have nevertheless been volatile and high.
Whether or not prices are lower than they would have been but
for restructuring, they certainly are not lower than they were before
restructuring. It is clear that prices remain high in many places and
large price disparities persist across regions. In the fourth quarter of
2006, residential retail customers in New England paid over fifty percent more for gas68 and about twice as much for electricity as their
market, see PJM, Territory Served, http://www.pjm.com/documents/maps/pjm-zones.pdf
(last visited Mar. 24, 2008).
See, e.g., Bruce Biewald et al., Synapse Energy Econ., Inc., Elec. Prices in PJM: A
63
Comparison of Wholesale Power Costs in the PJM Mkt. to Indexed Generation Serv. Costs
(June 3, 2004) (on file with The PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.); Scott M. Harvey et al.,
Analysis of the Impact of Coordinated Electricity Markets on Consumer Electricity Charges
(Nov. 20, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with LECG), available at http://
www.ksg.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/LECGAnalysis-112006pdf.pdf (finding benefits in
both the PJM and New York State markets); Ronald J. Sutherland, Ctr. for the Advancement of Energy Mkts., Estimating the Effects of Restructuring Elec. Mkts.: An Application
to the PJM Region (Sept. 2003), available at http://www.caem.org/website/pdf/PJM.pdf
(estimating significant savings across customers classes within the so-called PJM market in
the middle Atlantic region of the United States); see also ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., NATURAL
GAS MARKETER PRICES AND SALES TO RESIDENTIAL AND COMMERCIAL CUSTOMERS: 2002-2005
(2007), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil-gas/natural_gas/feature-articles/
2007/marketerprices/marketerprices.pdf (concluding that customers in New York, Pennsylvania, NewJersey, and Maryland who purchased gas from competitive suppliers paid less
than those who purchased gas from regulated utilities); Kira R. Fabrizio, Nancy L. Rose &
Catherine D. Wolfram, Do Markets Reduce Costs?Assessing the Impact of Regulatory Restructuring
on U.S. Electric Generation Efficiency, 97 AM. ECON. REv. 1250 (2007) (finding that investorowned electric generating plants in states that restructured their wholesale electricity markets experienced greater efficiency gains, in the form of cost reductions, than plants that
were insulated from competition).
64 See infra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
65 See infta notes 91-98 and accompanying text.
66 Tom Tiernan & Bob Matyi, While Switching Is Up in Texas and Illinois, Market Conditions Weaken in Most Areas, PLATYS POWER MKTS. WK., Feb. 26, 2007, at 1.
67 Comm'n of the European Cmtys., Communicationfrom the Commission to the Council
and the European Parliament:Prospects for the Internal Gas and Electricity Market, at 4, COM
(2006) 841 final (Oct. 1, 2007).
68
See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., SHORT-TERM ENERGY OUTLOOK 15 tbl.6c (2007), available
at http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/forecasting/steo/oldsteos/mar07.pdf (showing that New
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counterparts in the central part of the country. 69 More importantly,
those consumers facing the highest prices reside in the very states that
pursued electricity restructuring, while their counterparts living in regions where retail restructuring was not the norm continue to pay
less. 70 There are clear regional disparities in Europe as well. For example, during 2006, some Italian users' average electricity prices were
almost fifty percent higher than for their central European
71
counterparts.
To what factors can we attribute the persistence of high prices
and regional rate disparities? Some analysts ascribe the bulk of the
problem to increases in the cost of inputs.

72

The European Commis-

view, 73

sion holds this
though it also attributes high prices to the failto materialize in some European markets. 74
competition
robust
of
ure
Englanders paid more than $16 per thousand cubic feet (mcf) of gas while some residents
of the central part of the country paid less than $11).
69 Id. at 19 tbl.8c (demonstrating that New Englanders paid more than 16 cents per
kilowatt-hour (kwh) while those in other regions sometimes paid less than 8 cents).
70 Id. In looking at Table 8c, note that rates in both the middle Atlantic and New
England regions (where virtually every state restructured its energy markets) are much
higher than those in the east south-central region, where none did.
71 See European Comm'n, Directorate Gen. of Energy and Transp., Quarterly Review of
European Electricity and Gas Prices, Issue 8 at 3, 4 (Sept. 2006), available at http://
ec.europa.eu/energy/electricity/publications/doc/review/2006 _09qrO8.pdf (showing
prices ranging from C100 per megawatt-hour (mwh) for residential users and C60/mwh
for industrial users in central Europe, as compared to prices of C140 and C10O/mwh,
respectively, in Italy). Variation in gas prices was driven by prices at the few supply points
through which most of Europe's gas is imported (mainly from Russia). Id. at 5.
72 The majority of new electric generation in both the United States and Europe is
natural gas fired, and in many markets, the "marginal plant"-the plant serving the last
unit of demand and thereby clearing the market-burns natural gas. Thus, unforeseen
and significant increases in natural gas prices can wreak havoc with short-term electricity
markets.
73 The Commission says that electricity prices have, "on average across all users, remained relatively constant in real terms," despite fuel cost increases and that this "clearly
demonstrates the effect of increasing efficiency in electricity supply." Comm'n of the
Eurorpean Cmtys, supra note 67, at 4.
74 Id. at 5. Specifically, the Commission blames incomplete implementation by member states of the 2003 directives. Id. at 6. In European Union parlance, the process of
implementing Commission directives at the member-state level is called "transposition."
When a member state fails to transpose a Commission directive fully, the Commission may
initiate "infringement" proceedings, multi-stage processes that begin with a Commission
investigation and may culminate in litigation against the offending member state before
the European Court ofJustice. See Treaty Establishing the European Community (consolidated version), Dec. 29, 2006, arts 226-28, 2006 O.J. (C 321) E/37, E/144-45. The Commission has "launched 34 infringement procedures against 20 Member States for violation
and non transposition of the existing Directives." Comm'n of the European Cmtys, supra
note 67, at 6; see also Memorandum from the European Comm'n on EU Energy Mkts.
(Dec. 12, 2006), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=
MEMO/06/481&format=PDF&aged=l&language=EN&guiLanguage=en
(citing Austria,
Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, Estonia, Spain, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Sweden, Slovakia, and the United Kingdom as recipients of "reasoned opinions" for various failures to transpose the 2003 energy directives).
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Others ascribe high prices to this same general problem of too few
sellers chasing too many customers, a problem that offers the few sell75
ers in the market the opportunity to exert market power over prices.
This "too few sellers" problem, in turn, may result from regulators'
inability to prevent incumbent sellers from imposing entry barriers on
prospective competitors. 76 If this analysis is correct, there is a broken
market equilibrium in energy, one in which incumbents' market
power is self-sustaining; in other words, incumbents' market power
may be both cause and consequence of the barriers to entry in energy
markets. Regulators and policymakers are devoting a great deal of
effort to understanding this dynamic and to replacing the current broken market equilibrium with a functioning, competitive market
equilibrium.
B.

Market Power

The destructive role played by sellers who abused market power
in California's electricity market is well known and thoroughly documented. 77 California electricity markets were opened to competition
in the late 1990s, 78 and in the winter of 2000-2001, prices on California's wholesale spot market spiked, sometimes reaching daily averages
500 times higher than long-term historical norms. 79 The persistence
and magnitude of the problem led to the transfer (through energy
sales) of billions of dollars from wholesale buyers (retail service providers) to wholesale sellers,8 0 drove one major electricity seller into
bankruptcy, and imposed rolling blackouts on Californians.8 ' While a
75
See London Econ., Structure and Performance of Six European Wholesale Elec.
Mkts. in 2003, 2004 and 2005, Part IV (Feb. 26, 2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
comm/competition/sectors/energy/inquiry/electricity-final-part4.pdf
(presenting a
study of electricity prices in six EU countries, conducted by consultancy London Economics, which found that variation in market concentration explained a large portion of the
variation in retail price: that is, the lack of competition in sales drove prices higher). For a
fuller discussion of this issue, see infra Part III.B.
76
For a more complete discussion of this analysis, see infra Part III.C.
77 See FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, THE WESTERN ENERGY CRISIS, THE ENRON
BANKRUPTCY, AND FERC's RESPONSE, available at http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/
indus-act/wec/chron/chronology.pdf (chronicling the "major Commission actions during
and following the Western energy crisis and Enron's collapse").
78
Id. at 1.
79
See Michael W. Lynch & Adrian Moore, Power Tripped, REASON, June 2001, at 32.
80
In petitions to the FERC after the crisis, buyers on California's wholesale market
claimed to have been overcharged by more than $9 billion. The FERC ultimately decided
that the figure was a little less than half that. FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, THE COMMISSION'S RESPONSE TO THE CALIFORNIA ELECTRICITY CRISIS AND TIMELINE FOR DISTRIBUTION

OF REFUNDS 3 (2005),
response.pdf.

available at http://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-reports/comm-

81
The extended period during which California retailers were forced to buy power at
prices in excess of retail sales prices drove Pacific Gas and Electric Company, one of the

three major incumbent utilities in California, into bankruptcy. See Leslie Berkman, Bankruptcy by Utilities a Walk into the Unknown, PRESS ENTERPRISE (Riverside, CA),Jan. 18, 2001, at
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supply-demand imbalance and cost factors played a large part in creating the problem, regulators subsequently determined that the state's
poorly designed market also created easy opportunities for sellers to
exert market power over price and to otherwise "game" the system. 8 2
Many sellers took those opportunities, provoking enforcement actions
by the FERC, the U.S. Commodities Futures Trading Commission,
and the U.S. Justice Department that have resulted in more than
three billion dollars in refunds, hundreds of millions of dollars in civil
and criminal fines, and jail sentences for some individuals involved in
83
the scandal.
While the California market was uniquely susceptible to the acquisition and abuse of market power,8 4 some version of this problem
can arise in any market where there are sufficiently few sellers or sufficiently small supply margins, and American and European regulators
remain concerned about abuses of market power. While the United
States retains competitive wholesale gas markets, 8 5 the FERC has been
Al (discussing the "uncertainties... about how the state's power system would continue to
operate if Southern California Edison Company and Pacific Gas and Electric enter[ed]
bankruptcy proceedings"); Nancy Vogel & Nancy Rivera Brooks, Rolling Blackouts Push Energy Crisisfrom Threat to Reality, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2001, at Al (describing the January 17
California blackouts as "the most visible result of the months-long energy crisis that has
pushed the state's two largest utilities.., to the brink of bankruptcy"). One of the other
incumbents, Southern California Edison Company, saw its credit rating fall from "A++ to
D." Katharine Fraser, Electric Power: Wall Streeters See Cloudy Picturefor Power Market Restructuring, INSIDE FERC (PLATrs), June 18, 2001, at 7; see also Dave Lindorff, Judging the Judges,
INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., Aug. 13, 2001, at 32, 35-36 (discussing why major ratings agencies reacted so slowly to the California crisis).
82
FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, FINAL REPORT ON PRICE MANIPULATION IN WESTERN MARKETS: FACT-FINDING INVESTIGATION OF POTENTIAL MANIPULATION OF ELECTRIC AND

NATURAL GAS PRICES ES-I (PA02-2-00) (2003).
83 Largest Fines, Penalties and Refunds Ordered by Federal and State Authorities
Against Corporations for Manipulation of the West Coast Energy Market & Natural Gas
Price Index Manipulation, Pu. CrrIZEN, available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/
camarketfines.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2008).
84 Purchases through the short-term (spot) market provided the majority of daily energy loads for the California market of 2000. The California market cleared by matching
buyers' willingness to pay bids with sellers' willingness to accept bids, allowing every seller
to charge the market-clearing price. Because generation was in short supply, sellers could
rest assured that their capacity would be needed to serve load, meaning that sellers would
likely accept their bid. Because of the cap on retail prices, demand remained high and this
condition persisted. Sellers exacerbated the problem by scheduling a variety of fraudulent
transactions, such as making capacity available to serve imaginary loads or relieving conges-

tion and thus earned themselves money through arbitrage, making capacity available to
serve imaginary loads, or relieving congestion. See FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, supra
note 82, at VI-26 to VI-30 (providing a summary of the various ways market participants
gamed the system).
85 Even before the restructuring of wholesale energy markets, the FERC deregulated
third-party wholesale sales of gas because pipelines were largely unaffiliated with producers/sellers and the producer/seller market was decentralized and competitive. After a disastrous experiment in regulating rates charged to pipelines by gas producers, Congress
eventually permitted FERC to withdraw from the regulation of such sales. See Pierce, supra
note 38, at 11.
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more cautious about market power in electricity markets and has been
assiduous about conditioning grants of the right to sell energy at market rates (rather than regulated rates) on the seller's absence of market power in the market in question. 86 In its order requiring
unbundling of electric sales from delivery, the FERC was careful to
insist that the right to sell energy at market rates was a function of the
seller's inability to influence the market price unilaterally. 87 The
FERC's careful attention to this problem before granting sellers the
power to sell at market-based rates8 8 has not prevented complaints
after the fact that sellers have indeed exercised market power over
energy prices, even outside California. 89 The FERC pays continuing
86 The FERC's history of assessing and monitoring market power is described in a
recent proposal to change the test it uses for identifying the presence of market power:
Over the years, the Commission developed a four-prong analysis used to
assess whether a seller should be granted market-based rate authority: (1)
Whether the seller and its affiliates lack, or have adequately mitigated, market power in generation; (2) whether the seller and its affiliates lack, or
have adequately mitigated, market power in transmission; (3) whether the
seller or its affiliates can erect other barriers to entry; and (4) whether
there is evidence involving the seller or its affiliates that relates to affiliate
abuse or reciprocal dealing.
Market-Based Rates for Wholesale Sales of Electric Energy, Capacity and Ancillary Services
by Utilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 33,102, 33,102 (June 7, 2006) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35);
cf Dartmouth Power Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 53 F.E.R.C. 61,117 (1990) (describing an individual order granting market-based rate setting to a wholesale electricity seller prior to FERC
Order 888).
87 FERC Order No. 888, supra note 41, at 21,553 (May 10, 1996) ("In reviewing applications to sell at market-based rates, whether from new (unbuilt) capacity or existing capacity, we require that the seller (and each of its affiliates) must not have, or must have
mitigated, market power in generation and transmission and not control other barriers to
entry. In order to demonstrate the requisite absence or mitigation of transmission market
power, a transmission-owning public utility seeking to sell at market-based rates must have
on file with the Commission an open access transmission tariff for the provision of comparable service.").
88 The Commission's current ex ante test for market power in electric generation uses
two "market power screens": (i) a so-called "pivotal supplier analysis," based on uncommitted capacity at the time of the market's annual peak demand; and (ii) a "market share
analysis" of uncommitted capacity applied on a seasonal basis. The screens are not dispositive in determining the presence of market power, but satisfying both screens creates a
rebuttable presumption of the absence of market power. For a thorough description of
how these screens work, see Market-Based Rates for Wholesale Sales of Electric Energy,
Capacity and Ancillary Services by Utilities, 71 Fed. Reg. at 33,105.
89 In 1998, electricity prices spiked in Midwest markets prompting concern about the
possible role played by the exercise of market power. See Robert J. Michaels & Jerry Ellig,
Electricity:Price Spikes by Design?, 22 REcULATION 20, 20 (1999). Even outside the context of
crises, the FERC routinely responds to expressions of concern about the presence of market power in energy markets. See Sw. Power Pool, Inc., 118 F.E.R.C. 61,120 (2007) (rejecting proposed tariff revisions by the Southwest Power Pool in part because of concerns
about the susceptibility of the tariff to the exercise of market power by electric generators);
Long Island Power Auth., 118 F.E.R.C. 61,109 (2007) (denying challenge to New York ISO
tariff because of concerns that generators could exercise market power if the challenge
were granted); Exelon Corp. Pub. Serv. Enter. Group, Inc., 113 F.E.R.C. 61,299 (2005)
(denying challenge to merger because concerns over the ability to exercise market power
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attention to this issue, with an eye toward avoiding and remedying
situations where market power may influence prices.
European regulators face even more basic market-power
problems. Even before the California crisis, energy regulators in British markets were struggling with problems associated with the exercise
of market power by electricity producers. 90 The Scandinavian market
regulator also has investigated alleged abuses of market power in its
electricity markets. 9 1 The 2003 European Union directives address
this widespread issue using the language of European competition
law, 9 2 specifying that national regulatory authorities in member states
must ensure "appropriate and efficient mechanisms for regulation...
so as to avoid any abuse of a dominant position, in particular to the
detriment of consumers, and any predatory behaviour." 93 Because of
continuing concerns about this problem, the European Commission's
Competition Directorate undertook an investigation of the energy industry in 2006 and found a persistent problem with producers exercising market power in European energy markets:
Wholesale gas trade has been slow to develop, and the incumbents remain dominant on their traditional markets .... Incum-

bents trade only a small proportion of their gas on gas
exchanges ....

Although electricity trading is more developed, sales on wholesale electricity markets generally reflect the significant level of concentration in generation. Analysis of trading on power exchanges
shows that, in a number of them, generators have scope to exercise
market power by raising prices .. .94
There is no single European energy regulator to oversee providers' exercise of market power on European markets, and the Commission has become dissatisfied with its continuingly futile attempts to
were unwarranted); PPL Mont., L.L.C., 112 F.E.R.C. 61,237 (2005) (instituting a Section
206 proceeding to investigate whether the applicant was capable of exercising market
power).
90 Carl Mortished, Ofgem Moves to Stop GeneratorsAbusing Power, TIMES (London), Dec.
24, 1999, at 22.
91 See, for example, Nord Pool's conclusion that a major electricity seller had withheld generation to exert market power over sales prices in the Nord Pool market. Press
Release, Nord Pool, Investigation of Elspot Bidding in Week 18 (July 6, 2000), http://
www.nordpool.com/information/participant-information/finnish/2000/2000-029.html.
92 Article 82 of the European Community Treaty prohibits abuse of a dominant market position. Treaty Establishing the European Community (consolidated version), Dec.
29, 2006, 2006 O.J. (C 321) E/37, E74.
93 Council Directive 2003/55, supra note 53, art. 5, at 57 (concerning common rules
for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Council Directive 98/30, supra note
52, art. 25, para. 8, at 1).
94 European Comm'n, supra note 61, at 7. The report explains further that the problem in electricity markets is sufficiently serious that "even during off-peak hours markets
remain highly concentrated and that concentration levels, even in the less concentrated
markets, reach significant levels at peak hours." Id.
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force member states into implementing the 2003 energy directives
faithfully. 5 The Commission's inquiry into competition in the energy
industry signals the possibility that it will use its powers under the European Union's antitrust rules to "forcefully pursu[e] infringements
of Community competition law (antitrust) in the sector wherever the
Community interest so requires."9 6 The Commission's unannounced
inspection of several major energy companies in 2006 is further evidence of its intent to use competition law to supplement restructuring
97
under the 2003 directives.
C.

Market Entry

What is it that allows market power to persist? What deters entry
by prospective competitors into these profitable markets? According
to regulators, part of the problem may be market entrants' inability to
gain access to energy and the delivery network.
1.

Access to Energy

To enter the energy sales market, one must have a product to sell.
Prospective entrants into electricity markets face the choice of generating their own power to sell or purchasing power from existing generators. Likewise, entrants into gas markets must acquire gas, by
either producing it or purchasing it from others. It can be difficult
for new entrants to gain access to energy where energy production is
not a near- or medium-term option and current providers control existing sources through, for example, long-term contracts.
In the United States, the problem of ensuring access to energy
for new entrants is confined, for the most part, to electricity markets. 98
By the time restructuring came to American wholesale gas markets,
the industry was emerging from a poorly designed regulatory regime
in which pipelines tied up large amounts of gas in long-term contracts
between producers and local distribution companies. 99 Unbundling
See id. at 4, 31.
Id. at 12.
See Memorandum, European Comm'n, Competition: Comm'n Has Carried Out Inspections in EU Gas Sector in Five Member States, MEMO/06/205 (May 17, 2006)
(describing unannounced inspections of energy firms in member states of Germany, Italy,
France, Belgium, and Austria); see also Memorandum, European Comm'n, Competition:
Comm'n Confirms Inspections in the Energy Sector, MEMO/06/220 (May 30, 2006)
(describing follow-up inspections carried out in Germany); Memorandum, European
Comm'n, Competition: Comm'n Has Carried Out Inspections in the German Electricity
Sector, MEMO/06/483 (Dec. 12, 2006) (describing series of inspections conducted in Germany unrelated to inspections carried out in May 2006).
98 See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
99 See Pierce, supra note 38, at 48-49, for a description of how this situation came to
be. In response to gas shortages in the late 1970s, Congress passed the Natural Gas Policy
Act, which allowed a phased deregulation of producer-to-pipeline sales. See id. at 11. Desperate for energy, pipelines signed long-term "take or pay" bundled service contracts with
95

96
97
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helped the FERC free up the gas covered by those contracts, permitting most prospective wholesalers to obtain gas from producers. 10 0
However, when restructuring came to the American electricity
market in the 1990s, vertical integration was the norm and the problem of ensuring that new entrants had access to energy was a central
concern. Because the FERC's jurisdiction extends to wholesale energy rates but not directly to generation, 10 1 it could not force energy
firms to divest their generation rights. Nevertheless, its policy of limiting the authority to charge market-based rates to entities lacking market power has discouraged concentration in generation markets. 10 2
Furthermore, the FERC has, on occasion, revoked sellers' marketbased rate-setting authority after the seller acquired market power, returning those sellers to cost-based regulated wholesale rates. 103 In addition, most restructuring states have, as an exercise of their direct
regulatory authority over electricity generation, required or strongly
encouraged divestiture of generation by incumbent utilities.1 04 Although the availability of this divested capacity has helped, it has not
producers at prices that soon far exceeded short-term market prices when the supply side
of the market responded (in apparently unforeseen ways). See id. at 11, 40.
100
FERC Order No. 436 effectively rescinded the energy sales portion of those bundled service contracts, freeing wholesale buyers and sellers to contract directly with one
another. Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, Order No.
436, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,408 (Oct. 18, 1985) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 52, 157, 250, 284,
375, and 381); see Pierce, supra note 38, at 24-25. Many of those new energy sales contracts
were for much shorter terms. See Pierce, supra note 38, at 24-25.
101
Federal Power Act section 201 (b)(1) states:
The provisions of this subchapter shall apply to ... the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce ....
The Commission shall have
jurisdiction over all facilities for such transmission or sale of electric energy,
but shall not have jurisdiction .
over facilities used for the generation of
electric energy ....
16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2000).
102
See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text. FERC also prohibits power sales at
market-based rates between a franchised public utility (whose purchases will be recoverable
through retail rates) and an affiliate. SeeAquila, Inc., 101 F.E.R.C. 61,331, 62,373 (2002).
103
See Powerroots, L.L.C., 117 F.E.R.C. 61,007 (2006) (revoking market-based rate authority of seller); see also Illumina Energy Solutions, Inc., 118 F.E.R.C. 61,171 (2007)
(same).
104
Some states, including Massachusetts, Maine, and California, required incumbent
utilities to spin off specified percentages of their electric generation to avoid market power
problems and recover maximum stranded costs. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A, § 3204
(1988 & Supp. 2006); ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF THE ELECTRIC
POWER INDUSTRY 1999: MERGERS AND OTHER CORPORATE COMBINATIONS ch. 6 (1999), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/corpstr/chapter6.html; FRED BOSSELMAN
ET AL., ENERGY ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 953-54 (2d ed. 2006). Other states, such
as Texas, provided various financial incentives for firms to divest, such as enhanced rights
to recover costs "stranded" by restructuring. See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra, at 953. For a
good summary of these arrangements prior to 1999 and a description of the amount of
generation divested up to that date, see ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra, at ch. 6. See BosSELMAN ET AL., supra, at 953-54, for a description of the Texas and Massachusetts restructuring plans.
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eliminated the problem. Even if ownership of production is less concentrated than it once was, a few wholesale buyers still have the ability
to control production contractually.' 0 5 Thus, access to energy remains a primary concern for the FERC and regulators in restructured
10 6
states.
In Europe, the problem of access to energy for new market entrants is more acute, partly because some regional European markets
are less developed and partly because of the absence of a European
energy regulator with the authority to directly enforce the directives.
According to the European Commission, the problem exists in both
electric and gas markets:
[T] he prevalence of long-term supply contracts between gas producers and incumbent importers makes it very difficult for new entrants to access gas on the upstream markets. Similarly, electricity
generation assets are in the hand of a few incumbent suppliers or
are indirectly controlled by them on the basis of long-term power
purchase agreements (PPAs) giving the incumbents control over
the essential inputs into the wholesale markets. Low levels of liquidity
10 7
are an entry barrier to both gas and electricity markets.
Prospective retail sellers cannot access cheap energy on the
wholesale market because it is committed to other-usually largeincumbents through long-term contracts.' 0 8 It is up to European
Union member states to ensure the transition to competitive markets
and to transpose the European Commission's restructuring directives
into national law. 10 9 Nevertheless, some member states seem disinclined to undermine their domestic incumbents-so-called "national
champion" energy companies' 0 -out of fear that, in the new competitive marketplace, they will fall prey to some other member state's national champion. These national champions hold many of the longterm contractual rights to energy in European markets, thereby making energy scarce for new entrants."' This situation underscores the
105
See Market-Based Rates for Wholesale Sales of Electric Energy, Capacity and Ancillary Services by Utilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 33,102, 33,109 (June 7, 2006) ("[I]f a seller has
control over certain capacity such that the seller can affect the ability of the capacity to
reach the relevant market, then that capacity should be attributed to the seller when performing the generation market power screens.").
106
For a discussion of how these various regulatory entities try to encourage the development of new production capacity, see infra Part III.C.2.
107
European Comm'n, supra note 61, at 8 (emphasis added).
108
See id. at 9.
109 See id.
10
See id. at 207. Member states defend this kind of support in the gas industry by

contending that because so much of Europe's gas is purchased from a few non-European
firms, it is important for the buyers of that gas to be strong market players so as to keep
import prices low.
111
See id. at 8.
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dominant position these companies hold in their home markets and
2
further deters prospective entrants."
Figure 2 depicts the EnergyCo service area depicted in Figure 1,
this time after restructuring.
FIGURE
2: AFTER
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PRODUCTION
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DISTRIBUTON
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PRODUCTION
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Assume that EnergyCo continues to own the delivery network and
provide transmission services at regulated rates. 1 13 However, it now
sells energy through an affiliate in a competitive market at marketbased rates. After unbundling, EnergyCo spun off two if its energy
production units to that affiliate (Company C). To comply with rules
prohibiting any single company from exerting unacceptable market
power by controlling too much energy within a market, EnergyCo sold
its two remaining production units to unaffiliated companies: Company A and Company B. Even though EnergyCo no longer owns
Units 3 and 4, its sales affiliate (Company C) probably serves a very
large load and will need to procure energy contractually. If it uses
long-term contracts to do so, and purchases this energy from Companies A and B, the energy produced by Units 3 and 4 may not be available to prospective entrants to the market.

This support takes various forms, from subsidies to reluctance to enforce the antitrust portions of the 2003 directives against national champion firms. During the European Commission's sector inquiry, commenters complained about the adverse effects of
such "political benevolence" on competition. See id. at 207.
113 Consistent with restructuring rules everywhere, assume further that it provides
transmission services on an open-access, nondiscriminatory basis, perhaps through an ISO
of which EnergyCo is but one member. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
112
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Access to the Network

Even if prospective market entrants have energy to sell, they must
nevertheless be able to deliver their product to their customers via the
existing delivery network. Both American and European market rules
require transparency and nondiscrimination in the sale of network
services,1 14 yet regulators in both places worry about the slow formation of independent transmission-system operators to manage the delivery network fairly. 11 5 Claims of discrimination-claims that
transmission network owners favor their energy sales affiliates by
granting them preferential access to the network-are commonplace,
particularly in Europe.1 16 In Figure 2, EnergyCo could operate the
delivery network in a variety of ways that favor its own production facilities or its energy sales affiliate. For example, EnergyCo could provide
its affiliates with better terms or other advantages in the contest for
scarce capacity in the network. Even in the absence of such favoritism, if there are no secondary markets for the sale of unused firm
capacity, 11 7 the use of firm-transmission-service contracts can act as a
further barrier to entry by reserving capacity on the network that remains unused and unavailable for use by others. Therefore, unbundling rules in Europe and the United States aim to prevent just
these sorts of problems.
114

Articles 9 and 10 of the Commission's 2003 Directives, see supra note 53, mandate

functional unbundling of transmission from energy sales and specify that transmission services be offered on a nondiscriminatory basis. The FERC based the legal authority for its
Order 888 on its power, granted in Federal Power Act sections 205 and 206, to remedy "any
rate, charge, or classification, demanded . . . by any public utility . . . [that] is unjust,
unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential." 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (Supp. V 2005).
Order 888 required unbundling precisely because network owners were discriminating
against unaffiliated users of the network. See FERC Order No. 888, supra note 41, at 21,551
(to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 385). The FERC based its Order 636 on analogous
provisions of the Natural Gas Act. See FERC Order No. 636-B, 57 Fed. Reg. 57,911, 57,912
(Apr. 8, 1992) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 284).
115
See FERC Order No. 2000, supra note 43 at 810, 816 (Dec. 20, 1999) (to be codified
at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (lamenting the slow progress of forming ISOs in the United States and
speculating as to reasons for the "difficulty in forming a voluntary, multi-state ISO"); European Comm'n, supra note 61, at 10 (explaining reasons for limited choice among gas and
electricity customers).
116 See Neelie Kroes, European Comm'r for Competition Policy, Speech at Fordham
Corporate Law Institute's Annual Seminar 2007: Improving Competition in European Energy Markets Through Effective Unbundling 3 (Sept. 27, 2007), available at http://europa.
eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/07/574&format=PDF&aged=l&
language=EN&guiLanguage=EN (" [T] here is real discrimination by network companies in
favour of their affiliated supply companies in terms of access to their pipes and
cables .... ").
117 When a network user has contracted for firm rights to transmission capacity but
does not use those rights, secondary markets would permit the user to sell those rights.
Those markets can develop only with the (voluntary or forced) cooperation of the transmission owner. If the transmission owner's sales affiliate would benefit from the lack of
availability of secondary markets (because scarce transmission capacity would keep energy
sales competitors out of the market), such cooperation may not be forthcoming.
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In the United States, the FERC has overseen the resolution of a

18
steady stream of complaints alleging favoritism by gas pipelines'

and, to a lesser degree, by electric-transmission-line owners. 119 Rules
requiring that network access be scheduled using nondiscriminatory,
transparent, real-time methods, 120 coupled with the FERC's ability to
enforce such requirements directly, have overcome much of the resistance to unbundling by transmission-network owners in the United
States, 12 1 though the problem apparently has not gone away completely.1 22 In Europe, the problem is more serious. While the 2003
directives mandate functional unbundling, the European Commission
has not been able to persuade national and regional market regulators to force transparent, nondiscriminatory procedures for selling
transmission services on energy markets. To the contrary, in many

parts of Europe, the process of allocating access to energy-transmis-

118
See, e.g., Nat'l Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. FERC, 468 F.3d 831 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (reviewing and overturning portions of the FERC's revised standards governing relationships
between pipelines and their marketing affiliates); Amoco Prod. Co., 82 F.E.R.C. 61,038
(1998) (pipeline company showed favoritism to its market affiliate by allowing them extra
firm capacity); Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp., 55 F.E.R.C. 61,318 (1991) (loaning of gas
from one company to another resulted in varying prices for similarly situated consumers).
119
See, e.g., Cal. Dep't of Water Res. v. FERC, 489 F.3d 1029 (9th Cir. 2007) (electric
company required to allow anyone to transmit power over its lines but could charge tariffs
to cover the cost).
120
See Open Access Same-Time Information System and Standards of Conduct, Order
No. 889, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,737, 21,737 (Apr. 24, 1996) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 37)
(requiring the establishment of an "Open Access Same-time Information System," or "OASIS," for selling electric transmission services); Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After
Partial Wellhead Decontrol, Order No. 636-B, 57 Fed. Reg. 57,911, 57,911 (Apr. 8, 1992)
(to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 284) (requiring pipelines to establish public, nondiscriminatory tariffs governing gas transportation services and "electronic bulletin boards" for selling and scheduling gas transportation services in real time). These systems forced
transparency in the process of selling access to networks and made discrimination in favor
of affiliates more difficult. Furthermore, Orders 636, 888, and 889 have been implemented in ways that have promoted the development of secondary capacity markets. See
generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQoUESTERS: CONCERTED ACTIONS NEEDED BY FERC TO CONFRONT CHALLENGES THAT IMPEDE EFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT, GAO-02-656, at 20-24 (2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/

d02656.pdf ("Order 636... allowed shippers to release to other shippers unneeded pipeline transportation capacity . . . leading to the creation of a secondary capacity market
designed to compete with the primary pipeline market."). Despite their relative efficiency,
the FERC proposed changes in pipeline rules in November 2007 designed to increase the
efficiency of secondary markets. See Promotion of a More Efficient Capacity Release Market, 72 Fed. Reg. 65,916 (Nov. 26, 2007) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 284).
121
See, e.g., Nat'l Fuel Gas Supply Corp., 468 F.3d at 835-40 (summarizing the FERC's
efforts to overcome resistance to unbundling).
122 The FERC believed the problem of discrimination to be sufficiently persistent that
it issued its Order 890 earlier this year, which further circumscribes the discretion of electric transmission line owners so as to minimize opportunities for discrimination. See
Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission Service, Order No. 890,
72 Fed. Reg. 12,266, 12,266 (Feb. 16, 2007) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35 & 37).
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sion networks remains oFaque, 23 discrimination by network owners
in favor of their affiliated energy-sales companies is not uncommon, 124 and secondary-transmission-capacity markets have been slow
to develop.1 25 In a recent report on this issue, the Commission concluded that "[n] ew entrants often lack effective access to networks (in
gas, also to storage and to liquefied natural gas terminals) despite the
existing unbundling provisions. The operators of the network/infrastructure are suspected of favouring their own affiliates

(discrimination). "126
Since there is no single European energy regulator to enforce the
directives directly, t 27 the European Commission must rely on: (i) its
Directorate on Energy and Transport's ongoing process of enforcing
the directives against member states to induce national governments
to enforce the directives in their energy markets; and (ii) its Directorate on Competition enforcing European competition rules against energy firms.
This latter option-use of competition law to push restructuring
forward-represents a departure from past practice in Europe, but
one that the European Commission's Competition Directorate ap123 See European Comm'n, supra note 61, at 10 ("[B]alancing charges, clearing costs
and penalty charges are not transparent and often contain unjustified penalty charges,
favouring incumbents. Effective unbundling is necessary to create a level playing field in
the balancing markets and to reduce barriers to entry.").
124 On the gas side, one TSO granted its sales affiliate rebates on transmission charges
not granted to unaffiliated users of the system so as to give the affiliate a competitive advantage. See id. at 58. On the electric side, some TSOs procure needed generation to balance
loads by paying their affiliates for excessive reserve capacity, possibly at above market rates.
See id. at 10.
125
See, e.g., European Fed'n of Energy Traders, EFET Response to Francois
Lamoureux, DG TREN, on Questions About Progress in EU Gas Liberalisation and the
State of the Mkts. 2 (June 30, 2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu/energy/electricity/
report 2005/doc/market operators/08a efet-gas.pdf ("In general, and particularly in
the presence of long-term capacity ownership, secondary markets are currently not very
well developed or facilitated.").
126 European Comm'n, supra note 61, at 7. The problem is apparently most acute in
the gas industry:
Allegations have been made in a number of shippers' replies to the questionnaires that network operators offer preferential treatment to their supply companies and that this leads to discrimination to their competitors'
detriment, which maintains or even increases market entry barriers. This
concerns a number of different aspects of network access and occurs in
various Member States.
Id. at 60.
127 In early 2007, the member states of the European Union ruled out the creation of a
European energy regulator with direct authority to enforce the 2003 directives. However,
in July 2007, the European Parliament called for enhanced "'cooperation between national regulators at EU level, through an EU entity, as a way to promote a more European
approach to regulation on cross-border issues."' EUR. PAstL. Doc. (COD/2007/0198)
(2007), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/resume.jsp?id=5533292&event
Id=1008501&backToCaller=NO&language=en (citation omitted).
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pears ready to use. Recently, it has indicated its willingness to step up
enforcement of competition law in the energy sector. 128 It is the only
direct instrument the Commission has at its disposal to enforce market competition, since it cannot enforce competition ex ante. By contrast, the American energy industry is exempt from most antitrust
regulation, but that is because a regulator, the FERC, exists to enforce
competition directly.1 29 Thus, the European Commission reasons that
if there is no effective ex ante regulation to prevent powerful energy
firms from committing antitrust violations (such as discriminating in
granting access to delivery networks), then European competition

See European Comm'n, supra note 61, at 12 ("The Commission is forcefully pursu128
ing infringements of Community competition law (antitrust) in the sector wherever the
Community interest so requires ....").
129
The courts have created these partial exemptions. Courts defer to the FERC's primary jurisdiction over wholesale energy transactions and to state utility commissions' pervasive regulatory jurisdiction over retail energy transactions under the "regulated
industries exception" to antitrust rules. Reasoning that the terms of competition are regulated by the FERC, antitrust regulators and courts do not bring antitrust enforcement actions relating to activities regulated by the FERC. This is an offshoot of the "state action"
exemption-one that exempts private actions from antitrust enforcement if a state has
evidenced the intent to displace competition with regulation in that context. See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 102 (1980). The Midcal
court established a two-pronged test for determining when the doctrine applies. "First, the
challenged restraint must be 'one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state
policy'; second, the policy must be 'actively supervised' by the State itself." Id. at 105 (quoting City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978)). Prior to restructuring, both prongs of the test were easy to satisfy in connection with sales of gas and
N. Star Steel Co. v. MidAmerican Energy Holdings Co., 184 F.3d 732,
electricity. See, e.g.,
738 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding that Iowa's regulation of electric utility sales clearly satisfies
the Midcal test); TEC Cogeneration Inc. v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 76 F.3d 1560 (11 th Cir.
1996), modified, 86 F.3d 1028, 1029 (l1th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (finding that Florida's
regulation of electric utilities satisfies the Midcal test). But cf Otter Tail Power Co. v.
United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) (explaining that antitrust law applies to anticompetitive
behavior where the Federal Power Commission lacks the authority to order a remedy).
The so-called "filed rate doctrine" further supports the notion that antitrust enforcers
will leave the regulation of wholesale competition in the American energy sector to the
FERC. Historically, courts have used the doctrine, which insulates rates charged pursuant
to a FERC-approved tariff (filed rates) from collateral attack, to reject claims that such
rates violate antitrust laws. See, e.g., Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487
U.S. 354, 375 (1988) (the reasonableness of FERC-approved rates may only be challenged
before the FERC or a court reviewing a FERC order). It appears that the "filed rate doctrine" survives restructuring and can apply to FERC-approved "market based" rates. See
Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. IDACORP Inc., 379 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying the "filed
rate doctrine" to reject a challenge to market-based wholesale electric rates under the Federal Power Act). This does not mean that the FERC is free to permit, or turn a blind eye
to, anticompetitive behavior. To the contrary, the FERC's obligations under the Natural
Gas Act and the Federal Power Act to protect the public interest and assure just and reasonable rates require it to protect consumers against anticompetitive behavior and monopoly power. See, e.g., Fed. Power Comm'n v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271 (1976) (requiring
the Federal Power Commission to consider the potentially anticompetitive effects of rates
that effect a price squeeze on certain classes of customers).
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laws 130 can and should be used to ensure fair competition in the energy sector. Accordingly, in September 2007 the European Commission proposed the creation of an independent body modeled after the
European Central Bank to coordinate the efforts of national energy
13 1
regulators.
Thus, regulators on both sides of the Atlantic seem inclined to
address concerns about market power and barriers to entry through a
combination of tinkering with market rules and ex post enforcement
when those rules are broken. While that approach makes it more difficult for incumbents to control the existing energy infrastructure (access to energy and access to the network) to their advantage, it may
not be sufficient to yield a competitive market and lower prices. Why?
The answer lies in the strange interplay between politics and economics in the restructuring of energy markets.
III
WHAT Do WE WANT FROM RESTRUCTURING?

A.

Politics vs. Economics

Politically, the restructuring of energy markets has been a topdown affair, in both Europe and the United States. In both locations,
restructuring has been driven by elites-primarily, regulators convinced of the benefits of markets and industrial users who stood to
benefit from competition. For their part, industrial retail customers
with large, stable loads pushed for restructuring to free themselves
from the subsidy they paid to residential (and to a lesser extent, commercial) customers under traditional rate structures.1 32 Indeed, even
130 The European Union's competition laws are found in Articles 81 and 82 of the
European Commission Treaty. Article 81 prohibits practices that distort competition, including price fixing and other anticompetitive acts; Article 82 prohibits the "abuse of a
dominant position" within a market. See Treaty Establishing the European Community
(consolidated version), Dec. 29, 2006, 2006 O.J. (C 321) E/37, E/74. A large body of case
law further develops the implications of these general prohibitions.
131 See Explanatory Memorandum from the Comm'n of the European Communities
on Common Rules for the Internal Mkt. in Elec. 10 COM (2007) draft, available at http://
ec.europa.eu/energy/electricity/package_2007/doc/
2007_09_19_explanatorymemorandum-en.pdf.
132
In most states, industrial customers paid a considerably lower per-unit rate for energy than did residential customers, but the rate differential was smaller (by regulatory
practice) than what the market would bear. In that sense, then, industrial customers subsidized residential customers. As Judge Richard Cudahy described the deregulatory impulse
in the power sector, the "strong push, primarily of large industrial customers (and these
were the real force behind deregulation), was for retail competition (competition for end
users). To large industrial users, cheaper power was worth fighting for." Cudahy, supra
note 27, at 170. In the context of bundled wholesale gas rates, a portion of this subsidy
came from FERC's practice of requiring industrial customers taking interruptible gas service to pay rates covering a portion of the pipeline's fixed costs. See United Distribution
Cos. v. FERC, 88 F.3d 1105, 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1996). When the FERC unbundled transportation services from gas sales in its Order 636, it ended this practice. See id. at 1129-30. For a
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before restructuring, the industrial customers and the least-cost producers of energy were becoming adept at finding ways around regulatory barriers so that they could do business with each other directly
rather than buying and selling only through the monopoly provider. 13 3 This process of "cherry picking" the monopoly provider's
best customers from the system left its remaining customers to pay
ever-higher rates. This trend helped motivate regulators and policymakers to restructure the energy market. Thus, in Europe, most of
restructuring's legal initiatives have all come from the unelected European Commission;13 4 in the United States, the unelected FERC has
driven the process at the wholesale level, 13 5 authorizing market-based
rather than regulated rates (even in the absence of any express statutory authorization to do so).136 While elected politicians have helped
the process along at times,13 7 there has been no general popular

groundswell for or against competition in either Europe or the
United States.
Nevertheless, in democratic societies, elected politicians can overrule the decisions of unelected bureaucrats, which means that restrucsuccinct description of this change, see, for example, United Distribution Cos., 88 F.3d at
1167-69, which upheld the change.
133
Traditionally, both American and European systems allowed industrial customers
to self-generate electric power. Whenever new technologies could provide power less expensively than the monopoly provider, industrial customers could stop taking power from
that provider, leaving fewer customers (and fewer sales units) over which to spread the
fixed costs of providing power over the network. In the United States, most states permitted municipal governments to form their own utilities and to condemn the former public
utility's network facilities in so doing. Where prices are high and other less expensive
sources of energy are physically available but not legally available (because of the public
utility's monopoly right to provide retail service), industrial customers lobby for the creation of new municipal utilities whose power will come from these new less expensive
sources. This process, called "municipalization," can also leave the public utility's remaining customers to pay the system's fixed costs. For a description of municipalization in
American electricity markets, see Suedeen G. Kelly, Municipalizationof Electricity: The Allure
of Lower Rates for Bright Lights in Big Cities, 37 NAT. RESOURCES J. 43, 44, 48 (1997).
134
See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text (describing the European Commission's directives restructuring European gas and electric markets).
135
See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text (describing the FERC's restructuring
of gas markets); supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text (describing the FERC's restructuring of electricity markets with congressional help).
136
As noted above, since the 1930s, both the Natural Gas Act and the Federal Power
Act have mandated that wholesale rates be just and reasonable. See supra note 129. That
mandate has remained unchanged since the FERC began routinely authorizing marketbased rates over the last decade.
137
The Thatcher government imposed a deregulatory mandate upon itself, and the
Parliament accomplished much of its restructuring work. See Yergin, supra note 35. Likewise, it has been state legislatures that have restructured retail markets in the United States,
except in New York. See Sherwin, supra note 44, at 268; Deregulationof Utilities Gains Steam,
BALT. SUN, Feb. 3, 1999, at IC; Janice Francis-Smith, PoweringAhead: Legislature Considers
Forming Task Force to Examine Electric Utility Restructuring, THE J. REc. (Okla. City, Okla.),
Mar. 12, 2007, at IA; Mark Tatge, Senate Passes Electric Bill Giving Consumers Choices, PLAIN
DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), June 23, 1999, at IA.
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turing programs ultimately depend on the support of those
politicians. Assuming that elected politicians seek reelection, their
sense of how policy choices effect electoral politics will motivate their
decisions on those choices. 138 How do politicians calculate the electoral consequences of deciding whether to support the restructuring of
energy markets? Politicians know that constituents make voting decisions based, in part, on evaluations of candidates' (or parties') policy
choices.1 39 However, some constituents may know substantially more
than others about the relevant policy choice. 140 Similarly, different
constituents have different preference intensities over the same policy
choice; that is, knowledge aside, some care much more about the issue than others. Both of these variables-voters' knowledge and intensity of their preferences-not only affect how voters vote, but they
also change over time. Legislators know all this. They recognize that
voters who know or care little about an issue now may know or care a
lot more about the issue later.1 41 Thus, for legislators, the task of calculating the eventual electoral consequences of today's policy choice
can be very difficult. For each voting decision legislators face, they
must try to anticipate the consequences of their action alternatives; or,
in other words, the legislators must try to gauge how voters will feel
42
about each choice in the future.'
We can infer that in the case of energy restructuring in both the
United States and Europe, the great mass of constituents knew and
cared relatively little about restructuring policies when they were enacted. However, a small minority of constituents-industrial users,
merchant producers, investors, and some regulators-understood the
138 In the American context, political scientist Richard Fenno distinguishes between
the representative's "geographical constituency" and his or her "reelection constituency."
RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., HOME STYLE: HOUSE MEMBERS IN THEIR DISTRICTS 8 (1978). Of
course, the legislator must attend to the latter to keep herjob, and the legislator's relation-

ship with this group is the subject of much political science literature. See id.; see also GARY
C. JACOBSON, THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 60-61 (2d ed. 1987) (explaining
that the central task of congressional candidates is to decide which parts of a heterogeneous constituency to write off and which to court, and how to reach the latter group). In
proportional representation electoral systems common to many European parliamentary
democracies, this same calculation is made at the party, rather than individual legislator,
level.
139
See R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 14 (1990); WILLIAM
T. BIANCO, TRUST: REPRESENTATIVES AND CONSTITUENTS 14-15 (John E. Jackson & Christopher H. Acher eds., 1994); MORRIS P. FIORINA, RETROSPECTIVE VOTING IN AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS 10-11 (1981).
140
See ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 207-19, 237 (1957)

(noting that busy voters are rationally ignorant about many issues).
141
See ARNOLD, supra note 139, at 60-63 (noting that legislators must constantly attend
to the risk that a vote can rouse the "activated public").
142 For a fuller analysis of the interplay between constituent knowledge and preference
intensity on legislative choices, see David B. Spence, A Public Choice Progressivism, Continued,
87 CORNELL L. REv. 397, 421-32 (2002).
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issue and cared deeply about it, and that minority overwhelmingly favored restructuring. 43 For legislators or parties concerned with reelection, the immediate calculation of likely electoral consequences of
the decision seemed, therefore, fairly straightforward: by favoring (or
not opposing) restructuring, legislators could please the interested
minority without displeasing the indifferent majority if that majority
remained indifferent or became supportive of restructuring- as long
as restructuringdid not result in price increases. Many elected officials appeared to qualify their support for (or lack of opposition to) restructuring with the expectation that restructuring would bring lower rates
to their constituents. 144 That expectation was widely shared. In the
United States, the National Council on Electricity Policy's 2003 Report
on Restructuring bluntly declared, "Most lawmakers who voted to allow retail competition were convinced that electric rates would fall in
restructured markets." 145 Emerging doubt about the promise of lower
prices for all may explain why some American states have opted not to
46
restructure their retail markets.'
Note that as restructuring limps forward on both sides of the Atlantic, mostly at the behest of the FERC and the European Commission, a clear tension remains between the economic and political
Cf James Dao, Plan Approved to Let Power Users Pick Suppliers of Their Electricity, N.Y.
143
TIMES, May 17, 1996, at B1 (stating that restructuring in the United States has occurred
.mainly at the insistence of large manufacturers").
For examples of these expectations in the American debate, see, for example,
144
Co-ops, MunicipalElectricity Firms Back
Michael Davis, Sibley Throws Switch on DeregulationBill:
Plan, Hous. CHRON.,Jan. 21, 1999, at 1C. One Texas legislator promised that competition
would bring "not only lower rates but improved service." Bruce Hight, Senate Passes Utility
Measure: Legislators Work Out Details of Electric DeregulationBill, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Mar.
18, 1999, at Al; see also Michael Davis, Electricity Vote Put Off by Senate: Debates on Other Bills
Prompt Move, HoUSTON CHRON., May 27, 1999, at 1C [hereinafter Davis, Electricity Vote Put
Off ty Senate] (quoting then-Governor George W. Bush saying that the restructuring bill
would "reduce rates"); Chris Kraul, Radical Changes in Power Industry Pass Legislature, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 1, 1996, at Al (explaining that the California legislature passed an electricity
deregulation bill aimed to secure for Californians the cheapest energy in the country);
Dan Morain, Assembly OKs Bill to Deregulate Electricity, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1996, at A24
(noting that California's electricity deregulation bill faced "surprisingly little opposition"
after it passed the state assembly). In New York, Public Service Commission Chairman
John F. O'Mara promised that competition would "lower prices." Dao, supra note 143, at
BI; see alsojulie Carr Smyth, State Breaks PowerMonopolies, THE TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.),
May 17, 1996, at Al (describing the New York State Public Service Commission's unanimous approval of a plan to deregulate the state's power industry by 1998).
145
Matthew H. Brown & Richard P. Sedano, Nat'l Council on Elec. Policy, A Comprehensive View of U.S. Elec. Restructuring with Policy Options for the Future 2 (June 2003),
available at http://www.ncouncil.org/pdfs/restruc.pdf.
146 The COMPETE Coalition, an interest group working to promote competitive energy markets in the United States, commissioned a poll purporting to show widespread
public support for competitive electricity markets. See Press Release, COMPETE Coal.,
Multiple Surveys Show Consumers Support Competitive Elec. Mkts. Choice & "Green"
available at http://www.competecoalition.com/
(Aug. 6, 2007),
Power
Polling%20Event%2ORelease%20FINAL.pdf.
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rationales for restructuring energy markets. The economic rationale
for restructuring takes a long view, arguing that regardless of their
distributional and short-term impacts, markets will bring Kaldor-Hicks
improvements in the long run. The political rationale, by contrast,
demands Pareto improvements and focuses on the very distributional
and short-term impacts that the economic rationale shoves aside. This
tension between political and economic imperatives manifests in energy markets in identifiable ways. Energy markets cannot survive politically if their benefits accrue to a minority at the expense of the
majority; nor can they survive if their long-term net benefits entail
unacceptably high short-term costs. On the other hand, for energy
markets to work as intended, the distribution of benefits and costs
must necessarily be uneven across buyers and sellers and over time. It
is over these two dimensions of restructuring-distribution of impacts
across customer classes and distribution of impacts over time-that we
must reconcile the tension between restructuring's economic and political rationales.
Politics, Economics, and Prices

B.

This tension underlies several of the problems we see in new energy markets. In Figure 2, assume (plausibly) that when EnergyCo
sheds some of its production facilities to comply with market-power
rules, it spins off its most competitive production units (those that can
produce energy at least cost) to its affiliate (Company C), selling its
less competitive units to the unaffiliated buyers (Companies A and B).
Assume further that the cost of providing energy from the four units,
operating at full capacity, is as follows:
Production Unit

Capacity

Cost of energy delivered

(Owner)

(units of energy)

(per unit)

1,000
500
1,000
500

x
x
2x
3x

1
2
3
4
1.

(Co.
(Co.
(Co.
(Co.

C)
C)
A)
B)

Short-Term DistributionalEffects

Having moved from regulation to competition, each production
unit must now compete for customers. Companies A through C must
now pay for their production assets by selling energy on the market
since they are no longer guaranteed a return on their investments.
Generally, they will prefer to serve customers whose demand is both
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large and predictable: that is, industrial customers,1 47 represented by
the large circles in Figure 2. To see why this is so, assume that a residential customer's average instantaneous demand is 1 unit of energy, 148 but that it varies over time1 49 between 0.5 and 1.5 units.
Assume further that the average industrial customer's instantaneous
demand is 1,000 units, varying between 950 and 1,050. Almost all of
the industrial customer's demand can be served by a single production unit-Unit 1 or Unit 3-running at or near full capacity, 150 plus
one or more small peaking plants serving the industrial customer's
load above 1,000 units. By contrast, serving the average 1,000-unit
load represented by 1,000 residential customers is a much more costly
endeavor.1 5 1 Only half of that load (500 units) can be served by an
appropriately sized plant-Unit 2 or Unit 4-operating at a 100-percent capacity factor. The remaining demand, which will sometimes
reach as high as 1,000 units (for a total of 1,500 units of demand), will
have to be served by plants operating at less than full capacity,' 52 per15 3
haps much less.

This creates three serious problems for residential customers in
an unregulated market. First, if there are economies of scale in energy production, energy from the type of smaller plants needed to
serve the peaks of variable loads will cost more than energy from
larger plants. 1 54 Second, because the capital and fixed costs of producing energy must be recovered through energy sales, sellers serving
147

See Davis, Electricity Vote Put Off by Senate, supra note 144, at 1C (explaining that after

California restructured, small customers were "shunned by electric retailers pursuing more
lucrative commercial and industrial customers").
148 In the electricity context, instantaneous demand would be expressed in kilowatts
(kw), and demand over time would be expressed in kilowatt-hours (kwh).
149 While this is a hypothetical example using stylized facts, residential load does indeed vary much more dramatically than industrial loads, both daily and seasonally. See
JosKow & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 16, at 37-38. A predictable industrial process running
three shifts (24 hours a day) has nearly constant, flat demand. Households, by contrast,
have (i) needs that vary in predictable ways but vary nevertheless, as well as (ii) unpredictable variations in demand based on weather, etc. Thus, for example, a household's average instantaneous demand might be 2 kw, ranging between I and 4 kws; an industrial user
might have an average instantaneous demand of several megawatts (mw).
150 A 100 percent "capacity factor" represents constant operation over time.
151
SeeJosKow & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 16, at 40 ("A system with widely varying
loads will have higher costs than one with a stable load, all else equal.").
152 This hypothetical assumes that these customers' loads vary together so that their
demand peaks and valleys coincide. While an exaggeration, this is generally true, since
residential load within a market varies primarily with weather conditions and relatively
uniform usage patterns.
153 How often these peaking plants will serve this load depends on the shape of these
customers' load curves. There are quite possibly only a few hours per year when their
collective demand reaches 1500 units of energy.
154 Cf Brown & Sedano, supra note 145, at 7 (discussing the trend from the 1960s until
the 1980s where available technology and economies of scale made building larger power
plants "less expensive on a per MegaWatt basis").
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highly variable loads, like residential loads, have lower capacity factors
and therefore must spread those costs over fewer units of energy sold.
This means that each unit of energy sold will be relatively more costly,
all other costs equal,1 55 than that energy sold to customers with stable
loads. 156 Third, irrespective of these other issues, as the most desirable customers, industrial customers1 5 7 will have their pick of suppliers1 5 8 and will command the lowest-cost energy irrespective of plant
size or capacity factors.' 59 In Figure 2, industrial customers are likely
to get their power from Units 1 and 2, leaving the remaining residential demand to higher-cost units and making the per-unit cost of supplying that demand that much more expensive. 160
Finally,
restructuring eliminates any cross-subsidies of residential customers by
industrial customers hidden in regulated rate structures,161 thereby
exposing residential customers to prices reflecting the full cost of serving their needs. In all of these ways, residential customers will feel the
effects of unbundling in a more adverse way than industrial customers
1
will. 62

Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that: (i) attractive wholesale
and retail customers of energy can command long-term contracts that
lock up the most inexpensive energy; and (ii) residential rates have
not decreased under competition, at least not so far. However, all else
155
There are constraints on the kinds of plants that can serve peak loads. Peaking
plants have to be small so as to be able to handle finer gradations of changes in demand.
Among electricity generation technologies, most coal and nuclear plants have very large
capacities (in the high hundreds and thousands of megawatts), while natural gas fired
plants are often considerably smaller, making them more appropriate choices to serve variable loads. Peaking plants must also be able to dispatch easily and quickly to serve rapidly
changing demand, and gas plants can "ramp up" (prepare to send power to the grid)
much more quickly than coal and nuclear plants. On the other hand, fuel prices for coal
and nuclear facilities are much more stable than gas prices. Since most electricity generating peaking plants are gas fired, this exposes residential customers to additional price
volatility.
156
SeejosKow & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 16, at 20, 40.
157
See Davis, Electricity Vote Put Off by Senate, supra note 144.
158
See Brown & Sedano, supra note 145, at 25-26.
159
SeeJosKow & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 16, at 20.
160
As noted supra notes 132-135 and accompanying text, under traditional regulation,
industrial rates subsidized residential rates, mitigating the effects of this cost differential.
161
FERC Commissioner Suedeen Kelly described these hidden subsidies this way in
1999:
[R]egulators almost universally have tried to keep residential rate increases
to a minimum by raising industrial rates a bit more than a politically blind
cost analysis would peg them. In economic terms, in today's regulated
world, the larger consumers more often than not subsidize the smaller
ones. When generation becomes competitive (i.e., when the market sets
electricity rates) this will change. Smaller consumers will feel the burden of
the shifting costs from the larger consumers to them.
Suedeen G. Kelly, The New Electric Powerhouses: Will They Transform Your Life, 29 ENrWL. L.
285, 300 (1999) (citation omitted).
162
See id.
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equal, over the long run, new entrants, or the threat of new entrants,
should lower the costs of producing and supplying energy. The economic rationale for restructuring tells us that even if these efficiency
effects do not completely cancel out distributional effects, they ought
to mitigate them. Is that sort of mitigation happening? If not, why
not?
2.

Prices and Market Entry in the Long Run

In Figure 2, assume that all consumers' minimum base-load demands are satisfied through bilateral contracts with the lowest-price
producers and that demand above that minimum (to the peak) is satisfied by acquiring power on short-term or spot markets. Company
C's units 1 and 2 are dedicated to serving base-load needs under such
contracts and will have very high capacity factors; Company A's unit
and Company B's unit (units 3 and 4, respectively) serve peak demand
via short-term and spot markets, which serve to balance variations in
load. Presumably, as the provider of the highest-priced power, Unit 4
will have the lowest capacity factor of the four units, and Unit 3 will
have the second-lowest. Consider, then, Company D, a potential entrant to the supply market in Figure 2. The factors influencing Company D's decision whether to enter the market include whether it can:
(i) sell cost-competitive energy; (ii) gain access to potential customers;
and (iii) capture sufficient revenues from those customers to earn a
sufficient return on investment. In Figure 2, all of the energy is
owned by companies A through C. If Company D cannot buy an existing facility or power from one of those companies, it will have to
build its own production unit or purchase energy from outside the
former EnergyCo service area for resale within the area. If Company
D can produce or acquire energy more cheaply than that produced by
Company C, Company D should eventually supplant Company C serving the most attractive customers' base-load needs, at least until an
even lower-cost supplier comes along. However, this scenario is unlikely. 163 Incumbents often have access to the lowest-cost production
163
Certainly there have been situations in which formerly protected incumbent monopolies were saddled with inefficient plants. The post-Three Mile Island generation of
nuclear plants in the United States were built at exorbitant costs. However, during restructuring, the inefficiency of those investments have not penalized incumbents because regulators have treated inefficient plants as "stranded costs" to be allocated not to the
incumbent's shareholders but to ratepayers and taxpayers. Regulators made this choice in
the face of arguments that to do otherwise would (i) breach the "regulatory compact"
between licensed utilities, under which the government guaranteed the firm a fair return
on its investment; and (ii) amount to a "regulatory taking" requiring just compensation
under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. For a good discussion of these arguments in connection with restructuring energy markets in the United States, see Susan
Rose-Ackerman & Jim Rossi, DisentanglingRegulatory Takings, 86 VA. L. Rv. 1435 (2000).
In any case, stranded cost coverage freed incumbents from the burden of these invest-
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because existing production units may have fully depreciated their
capital costs and may face less stringent environmental regulation
1 64
than even their relatively efficient but newer competitors.
Rather, assume that Company D's energy costs 1.5x to produce,
more than Company C's costs but less than the energy produced by
the units owned by Company A and Company B. Company D is costcompetitive with Companies A and B, but Company C will continue to
provide base-load service, and Company D must recover its costs from
peak sales on short-term markets. Therefore, Company D must be
confident that during those times when its energy is needed to serve
demand, rates will be sufficiently high to allow it to recover its costs
and earn the desired return. Without a sense that it can sell its energy
at rates sufficient to cover its capital and operational costs, Company
D will not enter the market. Do existing energy markets offer Company D that assurance? Not necessarily. Future market prices are notoriously difficult to predict. Company D will have to project not only
its own costs but also the costs of competing energy from different
sources, including other new entrants. For example, the competitiveness of electricity from a new plant, such as a coal-fired plant, a nuclear plant, or a wind farm, will depend on the price of natural gas,
since gas fuels many peaking plants and gas-fired generators are cheap
and easy to build. Natural gas prices are notoriously volatile, complicating the projection of revenues for sellers on energy markets. Furthermore, the relative cost of Company D's energy will be a function
of future delivery constraints. Even if Company D has access to the
delivery network now, demand and supply may change in the future
so as to cause congestion in parts of the network Company D uses,
causing Company D to lose sales to customers it cannot reach due to
16 5
congestion.

ments and made their rates more competitive and their customers less attractive targets for
new market entrants.
164 This is true of coal-fired power plants and oil refineries in both Europe and the
United States, where air pollution regulation exempts older facilities from the most stringent air pollution standards. For a discussion of how the Clean Air Act grandfathers old
plants, see David B. Spence, Coal-Fired Power in a Restructured Electricity Market, 15 DuKE
ENVTL. L. & POL'y F. 187 (2005). The European Commission's Large Combustion Plants
Directive imposes less stringent emissions limits on pre-1987 plants than post-1987 plants.
Directive 2001/80/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2001 O.J. (L 309)
1. In Europe, the standards according to which nuclear plants were licensed varied widely
because there were no European standards until recently, resulting in clear cost-advantages
for older plants. Just the opposite is true in the United States, where regulatory scrutiny
greatly increased the cost of construction after the Three Mile Island incident in 1978. See
U.S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, FACT SHEET: THREE MILE ISLAND ACCIDENT 3-4 (2004),
available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.pdf.
165 For a discussion of the use of congestion pricing to address this problem, see infra
part III.C.2.
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The uncertainty does not end there. How will customers respond
to these price pressures? The price elasticity 166 of natural-gas demand

may be high in places where gas is not needed for heating or cooling
but low in cold climates where natural gas is the home-heating fuel of
choice, particularly in the short term. Over the long term, customers
do have alternatives, making long-run elasticities higher everywhere.
The actual and threatened interruption of gas supply from Russia into
Europe in the winters of 2005-2006167 and 2006-2007168 raised the
spectre of severe harm because end users had no reasonable shortterm alternative; however, those same supply interruptions have inspired Europeans to develop alternative sources of gas169 and to reduce their overall consumption of gas. 170 Likewise, during the gas
crisis of the 1970s in the United States, high prices eventually caused
fuel switching, not only by businesses, but by residential customers as
well. 17 1 Demand for electricity is different. To the extent that it is
used for heating, customers may have long-term alternatives. However, where it is used for cooling, demand may be less responsive to
price. Moreover, electricity is the lifeblood of the information economy. Thus, for all of these reasons, above a certain floor, demand
should respond to price over the long term but may be less price elastic in short-term situations.
Regardless of the price elasticities of demand for energy, there is
another reason why prospective entrants like Company D may be reluctant to enter energy markets: producers are skeptical about the
willingness of politicians and regulators to allow owners of peaking
units to capture scarcity rents when energy is scarce. Naturally, politicians and regulators prefer to protect customers (particularly vulnerable customers) from high rates and do so in a number of ways. In
both the United States and Europe, many jurisdictions have imposed
166
Price elasticity of demand is the measure of the amount by which changes in price
produce changes in demand. It is usually expressed as a fraction, the numerator of which
is the percentage change in demand and the denominator of which is the percentage
change in price. HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 276 (5th ed. 1999). For
studies estimating the price elasticity of energy demand, see STEVEN H. WADE, ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., PRICE RESPONSIVENESS IN THE AE02003 NEMS RESIDENTIAL AND COMMERCIAL
BUILDINGS SECTOR MODELS, available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/analysispaper/elasticity/.
167
See Power Games, ECONOMIST, Jan. 7, 2006, at 12, 12.
168
See Russia and Belaru. Loveless Brothers, ECONOMIST, Jan. 13, 2007, at 44, 44-45.
169
Specifically, Europe is investigating importation of natural gas from the Middle
East through Turkey and development of liquefied natural gas imports. See, e.g., Turkey and
Iran: Too Energetic a Friendship,ECONOMIST, Aug. 25, 2007, at 49, 49 (describing the planned
pipeline for importing Iranian gas into Europe); see also European Energy Security: A Bear at
the Throat, ECONOMIST, Apr. 14, 2007, at 58, 58-60 (detailing a number of possible new
sources of gas supply for Europe, including LNG).
170
See, e.g., Turkey and Iran: Too Energetic a Friendship, supra note 169, at 49; see also
European Energy Security: A Bear at the Throat, supra note 169, at 58-60.
171
For a summary of these developments, see Pierce, supra note 38.
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and beyond.173

During the California crisis, for example, the FERC imposed wholesale price caps based on "reference prices," estimates of prices that
regulators might expect to see charged during particular market conditions. Additionally, ISOs 1 7 4 in Europe and the United States sometimes employ reference prices as a means of identifying potential
abuses of market power.17 5 Some American states also employ price
caps as a means of stabilizing their markets. 176 As an alternative or
complement to these caps, some jurisdictions offer some form of "default" service or "provider of last resort service" (POLR service) for
customers who either do not switch providers or cannot attract a provider in the competitive market.177 Often, POLR service is offered at

172

See, e.g., PA. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N, ELECTRIC RESTRUCTURING: THE TRANSITION FROM

RATE CAPS TO MARKET-BASED PRICING (2007), available at http://www.puc.state.pa.us/general/consumer-ed/pdf/Rate-Caps.pdf (offering a simple description of Pennsylvania's
transitional caps).
173 FERC Commissioner Joseph Kelliher blames the persistence of retail price caps in
some states for poorly performing wholesale markets. See FERC's Mission Is Improving Competition, RESTRUCTURING TODAY (Apr. 17, 2007), at 1.
174 See supra note 43.
175
The PJM employs wholesale price caps, albeit very high ones. PJM's price cap,
found in its filed tariff, operates as a limit on offer-to-sell prices and is set at $1000/mwh.
Craig Glazer, Vice President, PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., PJM Open Access: Transmission
Tariff 401 (Oct. 10, 2007) (on file with PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.). The New York ISO
cap operates the same way and is set at $100/mwh. William J. Museler, President, N.Y.
Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., Mkt. Admin. & Control Area Tariff, Attachment B, Part III,
§ 3.5 (Feb. 1, 2005) (on file with the FERC, Docket No. ER994235-002, originally issued
Dec. 18, 2000).
176
In some American states, retail rates of incumbent utilities were capped until those
utilities had recovered all their stranded costs. Such was the case in California, where caps
forced Pacific Gas and Electric and Southern California Edison to charge retail prices that
were lower than the wholesale prices they paid for power during the electricity crisis of
2000-2001. See Cudahy, supra note 27, at 174-75. San Diego Gas and Electric, which had
recovered all of its stranded costs by the winter of 2000-2001, was permitted to pass
through its high wholesale power costs to customers. Consequently, its retail demand
dropped with the wholesale price increases while that of Pacific Gas and Electric and
Southern California Edison remained high. See Spence, supra note 1, at 436-37 n.69.
177
In Europe, the 2003 Directives authorize member states to impose POLR service.
Council Directive 2003/54, supra note 54, art. 3, para. 3, at 42. Both Europe and the
United States offer a variety of approaches to the provision of POLR service. For instance,
in the Scandinavian Nord Pool market, household customers may choose to take service
under a "price cap contract." See, e.g., Nord Pool ASA, The Nordic Power Mkt.: Elec. Exch.
Across Nat'l Borders 14 (Apr. 1, 2004), available at http://www.nordpool.com/information/reports/Report-Nordic%20Market.pdf (describing the various options available to
"small-scale end-users"); see alsoJim Rossi, The Common Law "Duty To Serve" and Protectionof
Consumers in an Age of Competitive Retail Public Utility Restructuring, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1233,
1288-1319 (1998) (noting the difficulty that energy providers face when trying to create
competitive markets while honoring the common-law duty to provide energy and how that
tensions plays out).
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a regulated or subsidized rate. 178 If POLR service is available to any179
one, it can put downward pressure on retail rates.
It is not difficult to see how price caps and generally available lowcost default service deter entry into the market by companies like
Company D. These market-distorting interventions remain in place in
some jurisdictions, and their persistence serves as a warning to potential market entrants about the unwillingness of lawmakers to expose
residential customers to high prices. Even in places where retail rates
are not capped, might they be if they rise too high? As proponents of
markets, European and American regulators recognize that market efficiencies can be realized only if price signals are allowed to workonly if potential entrants like Company D see prices that truly reflect
scarcity. For that reason, regulators pledge to intervene only in response to price increases caused by the exercise of market power by
one or more sellers.1 8 0 However, distinguishing between price spikes
caused by the exercise of market power and price spikes caused by the
capture of scarcity rents is no easy feat. If demand grows and reserve
margins fall, wholesale prices will rise; conversely, if wholesale price
increases pass through to retail customers, demand may fall. On the
other hand, if retail price caps are in place, or retail rates otherwise do
not move with wholesale rates, demand will remain high. Since energy cannot be stored, scarcity (and the higher prices it brings) will
persist unless providers develop newer, cheaper sources of energy.
Sellers, keenly aware of this fact, know that these situations create opportunities to demand very high prices in short-term markets. 181 Is
178 See, e.g., Elizabeth Drews, Takings in the Context of Telecommunications and Electric Utility Restructuringin Texas, 7 TEX. TECH ADMIN. L.J. 241, 261-62 (2006) (noting that in Texas,
POLR service must be offered at a rate approved by the Texas Public Utility Commission);
see also Gaye White, Energy Regulation, 57 SMU L. REv. 923, 943-46 (2004) (describing the
interaction between a POLR and a PUC).
179 According to the European Commission:
In a number of Member States, regulated retail prices co-exist with free
market prices for some or all customers. A majority of Member States regulate prices to households and small businesses, while at least six Member
States set a regulated price that is available to all customers. However, the
proportion of end-users that have stayed with the regulated tariff varies between Member States. Regulated tariffs will have a negative effect on com-

petition, particularly if they are set too low, so as to make cost-based
competitive prices unattractive.
European Comm'n, supra note 61, at 109.
180
See, e.g., STATE OF N.Y. PUB. SERV. COMM'N, STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING VERTICAL MARKET POWER 2-3 (1998), available at http://www.dps.state.ny.us/ (follow "File Room
Document Requests," then follow "Guidance Documents"; the document is located on the
following page) (discussing a proposed rule to control the ability of New York's utilities to
exercise vertical market power).
181 This is essentially what went wrong with the California market, though the problem
was badly exacerbated by the fact that essentially all of California's electricity was purchased through short-term markets in the winter of 2000-2001. Spence, supra note 1, at
425-26 n.34. Retail rate caps left retail sellers like Pacific Gas and Electric and Southern
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such a demand an unfair exercise of market power or merely the capture of scarcity rents? Neither European nor American regulators
have articulated a clear distinction between these two notions; indeed,
18 2
there may not be one.
Meanwhile, elected politicians, and possibly regulators, have the
authority to cap rates at any time. The European Commission's 2003
directives specify that prices must be "fair,"18 3 and the major American energy statutes require wholesale prices to remain 'just and reasonable." 184 Despite the commitment to markets in both Europe and
the United States, politicians or regulators conceivably would intervene to cap prices if and when scarcity drives prices to extraordinary
heights. 18 5 Even if regulators are committed to the economic theory
of restructuring, politicians may not be. It is easy to see how unnerving this state of affairs is for a prospective market entrant like
Company D. Company D knows that regulators are overseen by politiCalifornia Edison selling electricity at a loss for extended periods, damaging their credit
ratings and sending Pacific Gas and Electric into bankruptcy. Id. at 427-28, 440. If shortterm markets are supplemental (i.e., they are additional to bilateral, fixed-price, wholesale
energy transactions), the effects of price spikes are somewhat mitigated. Id. at 436 (noting
that California had forced wholesale buyers to conduct business solely through spot markets, thus maximizing their exposure to price fluctuations). Nevertheless, in the presence
of rate caps and delays associated with developing new energy sources, price spikes on
short-term markets can be severe enough to affect providers. Id. at 437 (noting that because the price caps sustained high levels of demand, they afforded opportunities to manipulate the market).
182 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals struggled with this distinction while
overturning the FERC's approval of the New York ISO's plans for controlling- "mitigating," in FERC parlance-the exercise of market power in setting market-based rates.
Edison Mission Energy, Inc. v. FERC, 394 F.3d 964, 965 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The New York
ISO's automated mitigation procedure would compare prices charged with a reference
price, or a price we might expect sellers to charge based on the cost of inputs and other
market conditions (called the "conduct-impact test"). Id. at 966. The court stated:
[T]he presence of workable competition tin the New York market] would
suggest that many, perhaps most, of the bids triggering mitigation will be
due not to market power but to temporary scarcity. At least this would be
so unless the conduct-impact tests somehow differentiated between bid increments due to scarcity and ones due to market power-which the Commission doesn't claim.
Id. at 968. For a discussion of the how some regulators and courts have addressed this
issue, see infra notes 183-87, 216 and accompanying text.
183 The 2003 Directives include "customer protection" provisions, which authorize
member states to "impose ...public service obligations ... which may relate to ...price."
Council Directive 2003/54, supra note 54, art. 3, para. 2, 2003 O.J. (L 176) at 42. The
preamble to both directives also declares that "household customers ... enjoy the right
to ... reasonable prices." Id. pmbl. para. 24, at 39.
184 See Atl. Ref. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378, 388 (1959) (noting that the
purpose of the Natural Gas Act was "to underwrite just and reasonable rates to the consumers of natural gas" (citation omitted)).
185 In such situations, neither American nor European law has yet clarified the line
between impermissible abuse of market power and the permissible capture of scarcity
rents. For a discussion of this issue in the American context and the question of when
market-based rates are 'just and reasonable," see Spence, supra note 1, at 429-36.
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cians elected by ratepayers. Assuming Company D serves peak rather
than base loads, its success in the market will depend on its ability to
sell energy (and earn revenues) only when prices are relatively high;
price caps (or the threat of other regulatory intervention to prevent
sales at high prices) therefore may be sufficient to deter it from entering the market. And yet if companies like Company D choose not to
enter the market, energy remains scarce, thus putting continuing upward pressure on price.
Thus, regulators face a conundrum, one summarized in a recent
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals opinion. The court noted that regulatory action to suppress prices pushed upward by market-power abuse
protects consumers, but suppressing prices pushed upward by scarcity
harms consumers; for price controls that do both, the "'crucial question .

C.

.

. is whether [such controls] do more good than harm."' 1 8 6

Fine-Tuning the Market

This dynamic-energy scarcity without market entry-is an inherently dangerous and volatile one, which can put both buyers and sellers at risk. The California energy crisis involved exactly this sort of
problem, although over-reliance on short-term markets exacerbated
that particular problem.1 8 7 Regulators recognize this and are working
to create rules that both protect consumers from price volatility and
encourage entry by sellers. Many of their efforts seek to facilitate market solutions to these problems by fine-tuning existing market rules.
1. Hedging Price Risk
Since the price spikes of the late 1990s and early 2000s, wholesale
buyers and sellers have begun to use a wide variety of financial techniques to hedge price risk. One simple way for sellers to hedge risk is
to acquire the bulk of their energy from somewhere other than shortterm energy markets. If sellers own their production units or acquire
energy via fixed-price long-term contracts, they can protect themselves
and their customers from price volatility on the short-term markets.
That said, retail sellers serving variable loads have to acquire some of
their energy on short-term markets; when that situation arises, energy
derivatives can serve to insure against price risk. The last decade has

186 Edison Mission Energy, 394 F.3d at 969 (quoting Md. People's Counsel v. FERC, 761
F.2d 780, 788-89 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
187
For a description of how over-reliance on spot markets worsened the California
energy crisis, see Spence, supra note 1, at 427-29.
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seen explosive growth in such derivatives-futures1 88 and iorward 819
contracts, options,1 90 and swaps' 9 1- which enable retailers to secure
the right to energy in the future at a specified price. The added protection offered by this tactic may be why trading volume for energy
derivatives has grown significantly in the last five years in both the
19 2
United States and Europe.
These hedging devices, when used by retail sellers buying on
wholesale markets, can go a long way toward protecting retail customers from price volatility. However, each entails its own costs to customers and so represents a payment for price certainty: the same as
when one pays for certainty when choosing a fixed-rate over an adjustable-rate mortgage. Perhaps this is not surprising, since experimental
evidence shows that many people are risk averse in this way-they are
willing to pay now to reduce future downside risk. 1 93 If the market
price right now is y, many people would choose a fixed price longterm contract at a price > y over a market-price contract with a starting
price at y. Derivatives and long-term contracts can provide that type of
188
An energy futures contract is a contract in which one party agrees to provide the
other party energy on a future date at a specified price. Futures contracts are traded on
commodities exchanges so that the exchange assumes some of the credit risk. Such contracts are cleared daily and settled financially-that is, no physical delivery of energy takes
place. For a good description of energy futures contracts, see N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc.,
A Guide to Energy Hedging 6 (Dec. 1999), available at www.nymex.com/media/
energyhedge.pdf.
Forward contracts are like futures contracts in that they too represent an agree189
ment to deliver and take energy in the future at an agreed-upon price. However, forward
contracts are not traded on commodities exchanges and leave the parties with more credit
risk. For a good description of forward contracts, see Thomas G. Kelch and Howard J.
Weg, Forward Contracts, Bankruptcy Safe Harbors and the Electricity Industry, 51 WAYNE L. REv.
49, 63-79 (2005).
190 An option contract is a contract in which one party purchases the right to make a
future purchase or sale at an agreed-upon price. BLACK'S LAw DIcrIONARY 1127 (8th ed.
2004). The purchaser of the option pays for it regardless of whether the option is ever
exercised. Id. For an account of the use of options in energy markets, see Steven Ferrey,
Inverting Choice of Law in the Wired Universe: Thermodynamics, Mass, and Energy, 45 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1839, 1937-38 (2004).
Swaps represent a bet on future market prices whereby the contracting parties
191
agree to exchange their interest-payment obligations. BLACK'S LAW DIcrIONARY, supra note
190, at 1488. For an explanation of the use of swaps, see Carolyn H. Jackson, Note, Have
You Hedged Today? The Inevitable Advent of Consumer Derivatives, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3205,
3208-14 (1999).
192
For a good description of European energy derivatives markets, see European
Fed'n of Energy Traders, The Past and Future of European Energy Trading (June 22,
2005) (on file with EFET). For a description of the American energy derivatives market in
the post-Enron era, see Alexia Brunet & Meredith Shafe, Beyond Enron: Regulation in Energy
Derivatives Trading, 27 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 665 (2007), which details the impact of the
Enron collapse on, among other things, consumer confidence in deregulated energy derivatives markets and how the energy market environment has been shaped since that time.
193
For an in-depth analysis of risk-adverse behavior, see Seth J. Chandler, Visualizing
Adverse Selection: An Economic Approach to the Law of Insurance Underwriting,8 CONN. INS. L.J.
435 (2002).
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certainty at a cost: those selling derivatives function as insurers who
(assuming they do it well) make a profit insuring others against the
risk of loss. That profit represents a transfer to those insurers from
energy firms, a part of which will be borne by consumers.
2.

Capacity Assurance

Regulators and system operators have tried a variety of different
approaches to the problem of ensuring that there is a sufficient supply
of energy and network capacity to serve demand. With respect to energy capacity, regulators in the United States and Europe employ a
mixture of mandates and incentives to try to ensure that energy is not
too scarce. Because of the limited ability to store gas and electricity, 1 9 4 regulators mandate that retail sellers of energy in competitive
markets maintain adequate reserves to satisfy peak demand. However,
this is easier to mandate than to do. This is particularly difficult in
European gas markets, where the supply of gas entering Europe is
limited and mostly committed to a few incumbent gas firms under
long-term contracts. 195 As mentioned previously, the European Commission and national regulators approach this problem in two ways: by
encouraging the development of new supply routes into Europe
(pipelines and LNG facilities) 19 6 and by forcing long-term contracts
open.197 In both American and European electricity markets, however, regulators are working hard to create incentives for construction
of new capacity. For example, the New England Independent System
Operator, a network management organization serving the northeastern United States electricity grid, uses a "locational installed capacity"
pricing system to encourage investment in new capacity.19 8 The New
York Independent System Operator specifies that retail sellers acquire
their reserve margin capacity at above-market prices that decline as
the amount of capacity purchased approaches the target of 118 percent of projected needs.1 9 9 The European Commission is also trying
to encourage the use of such reserve margin acquisition programs,
See supra note 28.
See supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
196
See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
197
See supra Part II.C.
198
Associated Indus. of Mass. Found., Inc., New England's Locational Installed Capacity (LICAP) Mkt.: A Primer (Apr. 2005), available at http://www.aimnet.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=home&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=6367.
The Midwest ISO also uses capacity auctions. See ICF Int'l, Inc., Indep. Assessment of Midwest ISO Operational Benefits 31 (Feb. 28, 2007), available at http://www.icfi.com/markets/energy/docfiles/midwest-iso-report.pdf.
199 This process is described well in Electricity Consumers Resource Council v. FERC, 407
F.3d 1232, 1233-35 (D.C. Cir. 2005). For a description of the use of a similar technique
for ensuring that sellers provide adequate reserve margins in New England, see Sithe New
England Holdings, L.L.C. v. FERC, 308 F.3d 71, 73-74 (1st Cir. 2002) and Central Maine
Power Co. v. FERC, 252 F.3d 34, 37-39 (1st Cir. 2001).
194
195
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particularly capacity auctions, to promote investment in energy production. 20 0 This is essentially the approach used by the PJM system,
20 l
where market concentration continues to worry regulators.
Proper pricing of transmission services helps to encourage the
development of new capacity, and the United States seems to be
ahead of Europe in the use of congestion pricing. In Figure 2, recall
that Company D could lose potential sales because of its inability to
get energy through congested portions of the network. Typically,
20 2
well-managed grids address this situation using congestion charges.
The sales price of Company D's power will increase costs associated
with its delivery, assuming the existence of some sort of congestion
pricing system on the delivery network. 20 3 However, while congestion
charges can offer strong incentives to build lines or production units,
they cannot ensure the siting of either. The problem of encouraging
development of transmission capacity is complicated by the FERC's
and the European Commission's lack of authority to oversee siting of
network facilities. The authority to approve or veto construction of
new network facilities lies with the American states and European
member states-rather than the FERC or the European Commission,
200 See Communicationfrom the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament:Inquiry Pursuantto Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 into the European Gas and Electricity
Sectors (FinalReport), at 14-15, COM (2006) 851 final (Oct. 1, 2007), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2006:0851:FIN:EN:PDF ("For electricity, implicit day-ahead auctions or equivalent measures should be promoted as much as
possible to ensure that interconnectors are used to their maximum extent.").
201 The PJM approach is based on its so-called "reliability pricing model." In a report
released by PJM's market monitoring unit on August 16, 2007, PJM found that its most
recent capacity auction did yield competitive prices and that, prior to the auction, generators had the potential to exert market power in all of its regions. See PJM Mkt. Monitoring
Unit, Analysis of the 2007-2008 RPM Auction (Aug. 16, 2007), available at http://
www.pjm.com/markets/market-monitor/downloads/mmu-reports/20070820-analysis2007-2008-rpm-auction.pdf.
202
In unbundled markets, sellers and buyers whose transactions use a congested portion of the network pay more to use the network through some sort of locational marginal
pricing. Locational marginal pricing takes account of the fact that congestion can prevent
demand from being served by the least-cost producer of energy if congestion prevents that
producer from accessing the network. Price differences for energy on different sides of
the constrained portion of the network may be used to calculate (and recover) the economic rents captured by producers who can avoid the constraint. For a good description
of how locational marginal pricing works, see Karl Meeusen & R. Scot Potter, The Nat'l
Regulatory Research Inst., Comm'r Primer: Locational Marginal Pricing (Nov. 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Users of the network willing to cancel or
postpone their transactions may avoid those higher prices and, under some systems, may
earn money for helping to relieve congestions. With its relatively low price elasticity compared to other loads, residential loads are often unable to avoid those charges.
203 Historically, transmission pricing did not reflect congestion costs. Users of the system were charged either a "postage stamp rate," a flat rate for transmission within a zone,
or a "megawatt-mile rate," a rate based on the amount of power transmitted and the distance. Neither approach reflected congestion costs. Now, most networks employ some
sort of locational marginal pricing to give users of the network the incentive to avoid congested areas. See supra note 202.
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respectively.20 4 Communities within these states that will not benefit
from the presence of new network lines (because they neither sell energy into nor buy energy from the line) may choose to withhold that
permission. To encourage more investment in delivery networks, regulators on both sides of the Atlantic could grant permission to some
developers to dedicate the new capacity to particular users for a period of years in order to finance construction, but the capacity would
remain unavailable to other entrants during that period of exclusivity. 20 5 The Energy Policy Act of 2005 authorizes the FERC to employ a
process, under limited circumstances, whereby it could force the siting of electric-transmission lines where the national interest demands
it.206 As of this writing, it has not yet used this power. 20 7 The FERC
and the European Commission are also promoting more geographically widespread grid management structures to facilitate long-dis208
tance bulk power transfers.
Each of these ideas represents an attempt to manage the market,
and some are quite subtle. Nevertheless, these are experiments-unfinished ones. For now, the amount of time and resources devoted to
creating these various incentives testifies to the market's own failure to
provide the right incentives, at least in some places. Is this merely a
symptom of the immaturity of these markets, as the term "fine-tuning"
suggests? Or is this an indication of some deeper incompatibility between economic theory and energy markets? There is no consensus
answer to these questions, and thus far, politicians and regulators do
not seem inclined to face them squarely.

204 See infra notes 226-227.
205 The 2003 directives authorize this with respect to transmission facilities. See Council Directive 2003/55, supra note 53, at 68-70. The FERC has approved this sort of arrangement for new liquefied natural gas (LNG) import terminals to encourage their
development. See Hackberry LNG Terminal, L.L.C., 101 F.E.R.C. 61,294 (2002) (prelim.
determination).
206 See 16 U.S.C.A. § 824p (West 2007).
207
The FERC has proposed a rule establishing standards for its use. See Regulations
for Filing Applications for Permits to Site Interstate Electric Transmission Facilities, 71
Fed. Reg. 69,440, 69,442-45 (Nov. 16, 2006) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 50 & 380).
208 This was an expressly declared purpose of the FERC's Order 2000, which aimed to
promote investment in transmission capacity by RTOs, whose larger geographic scope
would enable them to see the benefits of investment irrespective of the interests of any
local community. FERC Order No. 2000, supra note 43. For its part, the European Commission has promulgated two more recent directives aimed at facilitating the elimination
of network bottlenecks at national borders. By increasing capacity at these bottlenecks, the
Commission hopes to trigger more cross-border competition. See Council Directive 2005/
89, Concerning Measures to Safeguard Security of Electricity Supply and Infrastructure
Investment, 2006 O.J. (L 33) 22 (EC); REcULATION 1775/2005, CONDITIONS FOR AcCESS TO
THE NATURAL GAS TRANSMISSION NETWORKS, 2005 O.J. (L 289) 1 (EC).
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IV
RECONCILING THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS

OF RSTRUCTUPNG

Both American and European regulators remain dedicated to the
economic imperatives of letting markets work, while their political
overseers remain steadfastly dedicated to the political imperative of
protecting consumers from high prices. This silent conflict cannot
persist forever. It feeds unrealistic expectations about energy markets
and obscures the ways in which markets might bring Kaldor-Hicks improvements over regulation. If markets are to achieve efficiency benefits, they will do so through price signals spurred by market forces.
That does not mean prices will simply decline monotonically; to the
contrary, they will move in both directions, reflecting the forces of
supply and demand. When prices are low, demand will rise and supply will fall; when prices are high, demand will fall and new sellers will
enter the market, increasing supply. Economic theory tells us that in
this way, the up-and-down movement of prices yields an efficient result over the long run, yet it remains unclear whether we are actually
realizing any of that efficiency in energy markets. Restructuring is apparently nearing a crossroads where market skeptics and market proponents will have to confront one another more openly.
Market skeptics look at the current state of energy markets and
wonder why this experiment in restructuring has gone as far as it has.
They compare current energy prices to prices before restructuring
and conclude that market efficiency is a chimera, at least in energy
markets. 20 9 They doubt that energy markets can work efficiently. Perhaps, they say, vertical integration is the more efficient approach in
energy markets: in a market where good network management requires flexibility and speed, perhaps unbundling and arms-length
transactions create inefficiency rather than efficiency. 2 10 These market skeptics see regulators' attempts to fine-tune markets as a poor
substitute for regulation. All this fine-tuning, they say, seeks to do
what price regulation or state ownership used to do: namely, to guarantee prospective investors in new capacity a sufficient return on investment to assure adequate capacity reserves over the long run.
Furthermore, while fine-tuning markets may be able to induce investors to invest in new capacity, it does not necessarily protect consumers from all short-term price fluctuations. Some market skeptics
See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
210 This is, of course, the logic of Oliver Williamson's and Ronald Coase's work on the
theory of the firm. For an analysis of the efficiency of vertical integration in network industries, including energy, see RobertJ. Michaels, Vertical Integrationand the Restructuringof the
U.S. Electricity Industry, POL'Y ANALYSiS, July 13, 2006, at 1, available at http://www.cato.org/
pubs/pas/pa572.pdf.
209
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would protect consumers by making energy services a government
function. 2 1 ' David Freeman, former California energy czar, suggests a
"hybrid" solution:
There is a serious lesson to be learned from all this. A completely free market for electricity and natural gas is too volatile for
either the producer or the consumer.
Deregulation can work over time only if the price is not allowed
to go so low that it does not reward new capital, and where the price
is not so high that it punishes the consumer and businesses alike.
Let us put all of our ideology aside and accept the fact that we
are dealing with the oxygen of life in a high-energy civilization. We
need a hybrid policy of "floors and ceilings" with a market price
212
fluctuating in between.
Proponents of markets, on the other hand, may argue that it
takes time for markets to mature. To compare current prices to prerestructuring prices is to compare apples to oranges, they say. Rather,
we should compare current prices under restructuring to what current prices would have been under regulated markets. The jury is still
out on that question, but in any case, energy markets are young, and
regulators deserve time to set the conditions that will allow those markets to realize the promise of lower prices for average consumers. We
may find that some vertical integration is efficient and that markets
can accommodate that efficiency. For example, it may be efficient to
permit sellers of energy to own some sources of supply (such as production facilities). On the other hand, integrating transmission and
production is probably not efficient, and well-designed, independently managed transmission-service operators can probably provide
network management services more efficiently than a vertically integrated firm can. If politicians can resist the temptation to distort price
signals, markets can work, say their proponents. The proponents'
view, however, offers no comfort to politicians concerned about protecting consumers from high prices.
There is no reasonable way to proceed until regulators and politicians acknowledge both the economic and political imperatives of restructuring: (i) that market efficiencies cannot be realized if
The American Public Power Association argues that restructuring has failed and
211
that public power is the answer. See Am. Pub. Power Ass'n, Restructuring at the Crossroads:
FERC Elec. Policy Reconsidered 3-4 (Dec. 2004), available at http://www.appanet.org/
files/PDFs/APPAWhitePaperRestructuringatCrossroadsl204.pdf. In Europe, this solution
would represent a return to the days before privatization.
212 Electricity Markets: California:HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Energy and Air Quality of
the H. Comm. on Energy and Com., 107th Cong. 111 (2001) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony
of Sen. David Freeman, L.A. Dep't of Water & Power), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/reparchives/107/action/107-6.pdf. One might ask whether this is really
a hybrid solution or a prescription for the very kind of political intervention that deters
entry by companies like Company D.
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politicians intervene to protect customers from price increases caused
by energy scarcity (or if there is significant risk that politicians will do
so); and (ii) that vulnerable customers cannot be subjected to unaffordable energy costs. Thus, politicians must find alternative ways to
protect vulnerable consumers from price volatility-ways that do not
distort price signals. If politicians (responding to voter preferences)
cannot or will not find those alternatives, then markets will continue
to struggle with shortages, seller market power, and price volatility.
Such a case may indicate that voters prefer the certainty of (potentially higher) regulated prices to the risks (and potential benefits) that
market prices bring.
Can markets satisfy these economic and political imperatives simultaneously? The five essential elements of any sincere attempt to
bring market efficiency to energy markets seem politically risky. First,
politicians and regulators must make a credible commitment not to impose limits on the movement of energy prices in the absence of collusive orfraudulent
behavior. In other words, when scarcity drives prices high, politicians
and regulators need to let the price signal work to attract new entrants
into the market. This is much more easily said than done. Indeed,
such a commitment may be beyond the authority of American and
European regulators; the FERC is legally bound to ensure 'just and
reasonable" rates in wholesale markets, and European prices must be
"fair. ' 213 The U.S. Congress could amend the Federal Power Act to
prohibit political intervention when scarcity drives wholesale rates upward, 2 14 but state legislators regulate retail rates. 2 15 While the interstate nature of the energy network gives Congress some regulatory
jurisdiction over retail transactions that affect cross-border energy
transfers, 21 6 a genuine commitment to let retail prices float would
probably require the cooperation of state legislatures. In Europe, it is
unclear whether the European Union's jurisdiction over the single
market includes the power to mandate even wholesale prices. For
now, 2 17 the European Commission's only option for energy price reg213 See supra notes 183-184 and accompanying text.
214 Such an amendment might read as follows: "No rate produced solely by market
forces, including scarcity of supply, shall be considered unjust or unreasonable under Sections 205 and 206 of the Act."
215
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
216
The Supreme Court upheld the FERC's exercise of regulatory jurisdiction over
transmission associated with retail sales in states that had unbundled electricity sales from
transmission, reasoning that electrons associated with intrastate transactions may nevertheless cross state lines or cause other electrons to cross state lines. See New York v. FERC, 535
U.S. 1, 16-17 (2002). Whether this logic applies as easily to the interstate gas network is
debatable.
217
In September 2007, the European Commission proposed the creation of an independent body to coordinate regulation within the EU, but that proposal's prospects remain uncertain. See Commission Proposalfor a Regulation of the European Parliamentand of the
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ulation is to rely on ex post antitrust enforcement by national governments. 2 18 If the European Commission, the European Council of

Ministers, 2 19 and the European Parliament supported a regulation
that confirmed the legality of scarcity-induced price spikes, it might
provide the kind of reassurance prospective market entrants need.
There is no evidence, however, that any of the European Union's policymaking organs is considering such a regulation.
Second, designers of restructuredmarkets2 20 should ensure that buyers
on wholesale and retail markets have every tool they need to hedge
price risk. For buyers on wholesale markets (that is, retail sellers), this
means that regulators should not restrict their use of the full portfolio
of energy contracts, including purchasing energy through long-term
contracts (to lock in energy purchases at a fixed price) and derivative
contracts to protect themselves (and their customers) against price
risk. After initially discouraging the use of derivatives in some markets, regulators now seem to welcome their use. 22 1 Long-term con-

tracts are a different story. Where the use of long-term contracts has
locked up supply and foreclosed entry into energy-sales markets, the
solution is not to prohibit the use of long-term contracts. Rather, the
appropriate solution is to develop new sources of supply (such as new
electric generating units in places where supply margins are low or
new LNG facilities in European gas markets) and to support the creation of transparent secondary markets in transmission capacity. The
experiments that regulators and market monitors are conducting to
encourage new supply 222 should be permitted to continue, even facilitated where legal barriers will allow. Secondary capacity markets, for
their part, are much more common and function better in the United

Council Establishingan Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, COM (2007) 530 final
(Sept. 19, 2007).
218
See, e.g., Michelle Quinn et al., Charges May Be Pivotalfor Intel, L.A. TIMES, July 28,
2007, at 1 (providing an example of the European Commission's ex post antitrust
enforcement).
219
The Council of Ministers is the European Union organ most associated with national governments since it is staffed by the ministers of member states. See DAMIAN CnALMERS ET AL., EUROPEAN UNION LAW 101 (2006). There are several instruments the EU can
use to make law-each involving a slightly different process. See id. at 132-40. Directives,
the device most commonly used in the energy field, do not have direct legal effect on
citizens and are operative only if national governments implement them. See id. at 133. A
regulation, on the other hand, does have direct effect. See id.
220
In practice, designers include not only the European Commission, the FERC, and
legislatures, but also transmission system operators to whom regulators and legislatures
have delegated market management authority. See supra Part I.
221
See Saul Hansell, Market Place; Group Approves Use of Derivatives, N.Y. TIMES, July 22,
1993, at DI.
222
See supra Part III.C.2.

2008] CAN LAW MANAGE COMPETITIVE ENERGY MARKETS?

813

States than in Europe, though the European Commission is working
223
to promote such markets.
Third, politicians must assist regulators' efforts to broaden the geographical scope of energy planning. Although the European Commission's efforts to enhance cross-border energy trade 22 4 and the FERC's efforts
to encourage regional transmission planning 22 5 are good first steps,
they are only first steps. Some underinvestment in energy production
and transmission capacity may be the result of nothing more than local unwillingness to accept the costs associated with hosting the capacity. In such cases, we need not infer that local governments actually
oppose capacity additions; rather, they oppose capacity additions in
their backyards. When regulatory jurisdiction.is balkanized, as it is in
capacity siting in both the United States 226 and Europe, 22 7 local opposition can lead to significant underinvestment in new capacity. When
politicians block the development of new capacity, they are representing their constituents' rational preference to shift the costs associated
with hosting the facilities elsewhere. A national siting process in the
United States and a European Union process in Europe-neither of
which seems imminent-would, if they provided for the preemption
of local laws, eliminate this distributional resistance to the develop228
ment of new capacity.
223 See European Union Hopes to Reach Agreement on E. U. Congestion Management Guidelines
in March, GLOBAL POWER REP., Feb. 2, 2006, at 13.
224 See id.; supra Part III.C.2.
225 See supra Part III.C.2.
226 Though states and even local governments generally have the power to veto investment in electric generation units and transmission lines, gas lines are governed by a federal
siting process under which most state regulation is preempted. See 15 U.S.C. § 717 (2006);
StevenJ. Eagle, Securing a Reliable Electricity Grid:A New Era in Transmission Siting Regulation?,
73 TENN. L. REv. 1, 6 (2005). For a comprehensive look at federal regulatory preemption
in this field, see Frank R. Lindh, FederalPreemption of State Regulation in the Field of Electricity
and Natural Gas: A Supreme Court Chronicle, 10 ENERGY L.J. 277 (1989).
227 Member states retain exclusive regulatory control over the siting of all European
energy facilities except nuclear power plants. See Robert K. Temple, Note, Regulation of
Nuclear Waste and Reactor Safety Within the Commonweath of Independent States: Toward a Workable Model, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1071, 1076 (1994).
228 This kind of preemption is not uncommon in the energy industry. For example,
hydroelectric licensing under the Federal Power Act centralizes power in the FERC's
hands. While FERC considers state and local government interests, the Federal Power
Act's hydroelectric licensing provisions preempt most state and local laws. See First Iowa
Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152, 167-68 (1946) (discussing the
Federal Power Act's jurisdictional boundaries); FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, A GUIDE
TO THE FERC ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION FACILITIES PERMIT PROCESS 3-5, available at http://
www.ferc.gov/for-citizens/citizen-guides/electric/guide-transmission.pdf (last visited Mar.
24, 2008) (explaining how the FERC takes local interests into account). One problem is
that only some of the costs associated with transmission siting are typically compensated.
For example, landowners on whose land the line is sited are compensated for their losses.
See Regulations for Filing Applications for Permits to Site Interstate Electric Transmission
Facilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 69,440, 69,442-45 (Nov. 16, 2006) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 50 &
380) (discussing how FERC will compensate landowners whose land is condemned for sit-
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If regulators are to allow price signals to work, how might politicians protect consumers without distorting those signals? Market proponents might argue that the first three elements of the
prescription-credible commitments to let prices float, free use of
price-hedging techniques, and regional planning-will protect consumers by making the market more responsive to the forces of supply
and demand. To the extent that such efforts would protect consumers, however, they would do so only by trying to prevent the problem
of price spikes. The fourth essential element of a market solution addresses the question of how to protect consumers when prices spike
anyway. Market designers need to enhance demand response by letting retail
customers see, and respond to, the effects of very short-term price changes.
Things like time-of-use rates 229 and real-time pricing 23 0 communicate
to customers the time-value of using energy during different times of
the day and year. The more these rate structures are finely tuned to
short-term changes in market demand, the more customers can adjust
their demand to save money; real-time metering helps retailers to offer customers more and better opportunities to shape their demand
so as to save money. 23' When customers voluntarily reduce consumption and shave the peaks off demand, there is less need for peaking
23 2
plants, and satisfying load becomes cheaper for retailers.
However, even if these tools and techniques reduce price volatility, they will not eliminate it. The price elasticity of customer demand
may be higher than some market skeptics think, but it is less than
one, 23 3 and it approaches zero for some customers below certain floor

ing lines in so-called national interest corridors). Other less tangible costs, such as those
associated with aesthetic losses or fears of electromagnetic radiation, are typically not com-

pensated. Any proposal to preempt local laws could provide for compensating these less
tangible costs. However, such a system would have to grapple with the problem of monetizing difficult-to-prove costs and the incentive of those seeking compensation to overstate
their losses.
229
Time-of-use rates reflect pricing based on the cost of electricity during a specified
time frame. See NORESCO, Glossary of Terms, http://www.noresco.com/site/content/
info-glossary.asp?letter=-T (last visited Feb. 14, 2008).
230
Real-time pricing is instantaneous pricing of electricity based on fluctuating demand. See NORESCO, Glossary of Terms, http://www.noresco.com/site/content/
info__glossary.asp?letter--R (last visited Feb. 14, 2008).
231

For a thorough discussion of how much capacity these sorts of demand-responsive

programs could save, see U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY

OFFICE, GAO-04-844, ELECTRICITY
MARKETS: CONSUMERS COULD BENEFIT FROM DEMAND PROGRAMS, BUT CHALLENGES REMAIN

21-31 (2004). While real-time meters would pay for themselves relatively quickly, they
need to be installed at every customer's connection to work efficiently. In most places, the
problem of coordinating and financing the installation of meters has thus far proven insurmountable. See id. at 31-42.
232
See id. at 27-28.
233
See supra note 166 for an explanation of how price elasticities of demand are expressed and measured.
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levels of demand. 23 4 When scarcity drives prices to unaffordable
levels, customers who cannot afford those prices need help. Thefifth
and final element of a market solution is to subsidize needy customers when
prices exceed their ability to pay. It would be far better to subsidize those
customers' payments than to simply cap prices or to ascribe impermissible market power to sellers in such situations. Ratepayers or taxpayers could provide that subsidy, placing remaining price risk on the
shoulders of all ratepayers (or taxpayers, depending on whether a rate
charge or taxes fund the subsidy). This approach has several advantages. It protects only the truly needy235 and not those who can afford
the higher prices (or adjust their demand to avoid unaffordable
rates) .236 In so doing, it forces better demand response when prices
rise to very high levels. In the long run, it forces all customers to
recognize the connection between price on the one hand and the supply and demand for energy on the other. This recognition ought to
reduce significantly short-term variations in demand. More predictable demand, in turn, ought to reduce the number of peaking plants
necessary to serve a given average load and make the investment environment for prospective market entrants (like Company D) much
more attractive.
This portfolio of policies might seem politically ambitious, to say
the least.2 37 If so, we ought to ask ourselves why that is. Such policies

are essentially a plea for energy-market rules that confront voters
(ratepayers) with the full logic of markets: that is, rules that establish
energy markets that clearly demonstrate to voters the tradeoff between long-term price reductions and short-term price volatility.
Without such policies, energy markets have little chance to realize the
234
This should be intuitively reasonable if we assume that gas and electricity are, for
some customers at some times of year, truly essential commodities. However, that proposi-

tion assumes that customers can afford to pay for energy at the floor level of demand. If
they cannot, then perhaps price elasticities are higher at lower levels of demand but for
politically unacceptable reasons. See supra note 166 for a measure of these elasticities.
235
Identifying the "truly needy" is the kind of decision that governments make regularly, but in this context it is complicated by the fact that the class of customers who "cannot afford" energy will vary with the price of energy. Those living in poverty may not be
able to afford energy at price x, while middle class customers may not be able to afford
energy at the price of 50x.
236
Most POLR or default service programs in the United States and Europe do not
subsidize ratepayers in this way. Rather, they keep rates low and limit access to default
service to the needy. See, e.g., White, supra note 178, at 943-44. Rate subsidy programs for
the needy do exist in many places, but they tend to involve a binary one-time decision
whether the customer qualifies for the subsidy based on a static means test.
237
On the other hand, the FERC seems to be moving in this direction with its recently
published advanced notice of proposed rulemaking soliciting comment on a package of
proposals designed to make wholesale markets in the United States more efficient. See
Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Electric Markets, 72 Fed. Reg. 36,276
(proposed June 22, 2007) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35), available at http://
www.fer.gov/whats-new/comm-meet/2007/062107/E-3.pdf.
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long-term efficiencies promised to voters. However, to date, neither
regulators nor politicians have seen fit to confront voters with these
truths. If voters' democratically elected representatives prefer to
shield voters from the truth about how markets work, then those
elected representatives ought to rethink their support for markets in
the first place. Indeed, some are already doing so. The normally market-oriented CATO institute has reversed its former support for restructuring energy markets and now favors a return to traditional
regulation because it believes that politicians cannot bring themselves
to support truly free-floating energy prices. 2 38 The state of Virginia
recently reversed course on restructuring 239 and is planning to return
to traditional regulation; similarly, the former governor of New York
recently expressed reservations about restructuring there. 2 40 Elected
politicians are good at estimating voters' future preferences: that is
part of what makes them successful politicians. If voters are willing to
pay more to avoid price risk, then isn't it better to return to traditional
regulation or even government provision of energy services?
Perhaps it is, but only with two important caveats. First, some
advocates of reregulation pose a false choice between full exposure to
price risk (markets) and no exposure to risk (regulation). While regulation can reduce price risk for customers, properly functioning markets can reduce much of that risk, too. The policy prescription
outlined here would protect the most vulnerable customers from
price risk and would shield other customers from much of the risk
they face now by facilitating market responses to price. Second, a return to regulation might mean higher long-term rates than some market skeptics anticipate, since reregulation would almost certainly be
limited to retail markets, and industrial and municipal customers will
continue to try to cherry-pick the cheapest energy away from customers of public utility systems. 24 1 Even the most ardent market skeptics
do not advocate rebundling wholesale energy sales and delivery;
rather, they advocate bundling retail services, in part so that monopoly suppliers can protect retail customers from price risk. That means
that third-party producers of inexpensive energy will remain a part of
238
See Harry M. Trebing & Sarah P. Voll, InfrastructureDeregulationand Privatization in
Industrialized and Emerging Economies, 40 J. ECON. ISSUEs 307, 308 (2006).
239 Energy Markets; Va. Governor Proposes Tougher Enviro Requirements for DeregulationBill,
GREENWIRE, Mar. 28, 2007, http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/2007/03/28/3/.
240
See Alex Philippidis & Bob Rozycki, What Changes Await Albany on Day One, WESTCHESTER CoUNry Bus. J., Oct. 30, 2006, at 1 (discussing Eliot Spitzer's plans to increase
regulation of utilities); see alsoFirst Virginia, Now Michigan?, RESTRUCTURING TODAY, Mar. 30,
2007, at 1 (describing a proposed statute eliminating competition in Michigan); New Jersey
Working Group Could Spell Disasterfor Market, RESTRUCruRING TODAY, Apr. 5, 2007, at 1
(describing New Jersey's review of its electricity market).
241
For a description of this "cherry-picking" tendency, see supra note 133 and accompanying text.
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the market and that producers and desirable industrial customers will
continue to try to do business with one another, irrespective of regula24 2
tory rules privileging the monopoly energy provider.
Thus, regulators and policymakers face a choice between: (i) a
future spent regulating to prevent or mitigate price volatility in restructured markets and to protect vulnerable consumers from that volatility; or (ii) one spent regulating a bifurcated system in which the
smallest customers with the most variable demand comprise an everincreasing percentage of the load served by regulated, monopolistic
providers. Elected politicians may reasonably choose either alternative, and neither is perfect. Indeed, that is the point: perfection is not
possible in energy markets, and to the extent that regulators and politicians pretend otherwise (to voters), they reduce the probability that
markets will work to consumers' benefit. It may be politically painful
to do so, but when voters face the difficult tradeoffs that restructuring
presents, better energy policies will result.

242
For a description of "municipalization" and other ways that industrial customers
find their way to least-cost energy providers (and off of the monopoly provider's network)
even in a regulated environment, see supra note 133.
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